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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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19 January 1985

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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ALBANIA

ATA ON U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD UN ORGANIZATIONS

AU291356 Tirana ATA in English 0745 GMT 29 Dec 84

[Text] Tirana, 29 Dec (ATA)--The American newspaper WASHINGTON POST announced recently that the United States has declared that it will withdraw from UN Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO. The above announcement was not unexpected and occasional. It was made after the other threat on the part of the United States to leave UNESCO by the end of 1984, a decision which was supported only by Britain and which Washington tried to impose on the other European countries.

In order to justify their withdrawal from these organisations, the United States is trying to present itself in the role of the abused and accused by the other members, and are describing them as political forums of anti-American attitudes, of their politicizing, of mismanagement and misuse of the funds, etc. But UNESCO president, M'Bow, rejecting the American accusations as groundless, declared that "the United States complains of giving a political character to this international organisation but in fact it is they themselves that are doing such a thing."

The U.S. threat to withdraw from these organisations are part and parcel of their campaign to discredit them, to manipulate them and then put them in their service. We have to do here with an open political blackmail against the member countries of these UN organisations. The United States would like that only its voice be heard, the voice of the defense and promotion of the American interest. The American imperialists would like that only the forms have an international character while the United States makes the law there. In the present day situation the aim of the United States is to create a tense situation of mistrust in the fold of these organizations, to suspend their activity so that the United States appears later in the role of the saviour, proving that without this role these organizations cannot function and there is no other alternative except submission.

But in face of this entire campaign of American pressures, strong reactions are heard from the members countries, especially from the developing countries which make up the majority. They are showing that they will never allow to be deprived of their right to oppose, denounce and expose every imperialist and social imperialist action, which violates their national rights.

ALBANIA

REPORT ON SOVIET CRUISE MISSILE INCIDENT

AU041000 Tirana ATA in English 0930 GMT 4 Jan 85

["A Soviet Missile Violates the Airspace of Norway and Finland"--ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, 4 Jan (ATA)--As the news agencies report, referring to official Norwegian sources, a Soviet cruise missile violated the airspace of Norway and Finland last Friday. A Norwegian spokesman stressed that we have information that the cruise missile must have crashed on the Finnish territory. Likewise a Finnish military spokesman confirmed a violation of the airspace of Finland last Friday. The spokesman reported that Finnish border guard started on Thursday to search for traces of the downed missile. The Foreign Ministry of Finland reported that it expects a complete report from the border guards. The reports inform that the missile is fired from a nuclear submarine of Murmansk base of Kola Peninsula.

The violation of the airspace of the other countries by the Soviet and American jets and missiles has already become an ordinary practice for the two superpowers. The great arsenals of the American and Soviet nuclear missiles in Europe as well as the frequent maneuvers conducted with these weapons have grave consequences for the European peoples and have aroused indignation and protests in the public opinion of different countries of Europe. The reports of the news agencies point out that a few days ago, the president of Finland Koivisto voiced his concern for the consequences of the deployment of cruise missiles in Europe. Stressing that cruise missiles are a cause of the insecurity in the Scandinavian peninsula he demanded the withdrawal of such missiles deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Treaty from the European territory.

CSO: 2020/40

AWP PAPER ON FOREIGN POLICY PRINCIPLES

AU221703 Tirana ATA in English 0930 GMT 22 Dec 84

["The Marxist-Leninist Principles--The Key to the Correct Understanding and Appreciation of Events and Conjunctures--Article of the Newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT"--ATA headline]

Text] Tirana, 22 Dec (ATA)--The relations between the principle and conjuncture, the place each of them occupies in understanding and appreciating the events and processes of the international life, their role in adopting the stands and drafting the line of the foreign policy, have become today one of the sharpest theoretical-political problems in the field of international relations, the newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT stresses in an article written by Shaban Murati. The main tendency of the bourgeois and revisionist theoreticians and politicians is to give the central and definite place to the conjuncture and describe it as the foundation of the foreign policy, as a sole way "to conduct politics." "The bourgeois and revisionist politicians," Comrade Enver Hoxha has said, "resort too much to tricks, false methods and behaviours flatteries and hypocritical stands in compliance with the conjunctures created in the world situation."

The debate on the relations between the principle and conjuncture in the foreign policy is not something occasional and is nourished by deep political, ideological, class and strategic imperialist and revisionist motives, the newspaper stresses. At the present situation of the aggravation of the international situation as a result of the aggressive and hegemonistic policy of the imperialist superpowers against the interests of the people, the defense of the principled stands in the field of foreign policy comes more and more to the fore. A brilliant example of a principled revolutionary and proletarian Marxist-Leninist policy is the foreign policy of our party and country. In the greeting on occasion of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland, Comrade Enver Hoxha stressed: "We have not permitted the principles of our foreign policy to be subordinated to the momentary changes in the world situation. We always take the international political and economic situation into account, but in our relations with other states in our stands, we have always been guided by the Marxist-Leninist principles, because they are the key to the correct understanding and assessment of world events, circumstances that arise, the intrigues and aims of imperialism towards the aspirations of the revolutionary forces, the peoples and the proletariat of each country and the whole world."

This principled policy constitutes a permanent and unchanged component of the existence and revolutionary activity of socialist Albania on the international arena in these 40 years of its free life, ZERI I POPPULIT stresses. One of the fundamental characteristics of the principled foreign policy of our party and country has been the noninterference in the home affairs of other countries. The differences concerning the political and ideological views have never hindered Albania to demand and develop normal relations with mutual profit with the peoples and countries that have wished the same thing. There is not at least a single case in the history of international relations of the Albanian socialist state that it has impaired in the slightest the rights of the other countries or that it has interfered in their home affairs, despite the great political, economic, historic debts, etc., that the imperialist and revisionist states owe to our country. Our foreign policy has never been a policy of nationalism and chauvinism even when the others have combatted our socialist state and its principled foreign policy from the positions of frenzied nationalism and chauvinism.

The principled stand of the PLA is manifested in the consistent revolutionary thinking and action in the field of foreign policy and of the international relations. Our party, the newspaper writes, has never hidden its correct views and stands for the sake of the diplomacy, for the sake of the profits of the moment, the pressure or flatteries of the superpowers or the other imperialist powers. This has happened because our foreign policy expresses the voice of Albania, because it is not conditioned by the participation in military blocs or the political and economic alliances with the superpowers and the other imperialist powers, because it is not conditioned by bases, troops, investments, credits and foreign aids. "Who thinks that Albania changes its Marxist-Leninist policy because it allegedly sells one thousand tons of chrome more to a country or one hundred tons of tobacco less to another," Comrade Enver Hoxha stresses, "is mistaken and is blind to faults."

The foreign principled policy of our party and state has never subjected its principles to the political conjunctures of the moment. It has developed all its relations with the other countries, it has adopted all its stands on international arena according to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. "Keeping always in view both the interests of the Albanian people and the other peoples and the constant equilibrium between them," ZERI I POPPULIT stresses, has been a Marxist-Leninist feature of our foreign policy. Based on the Marxist-Leninist ideology and on the teachings of Comrade Enver Hoxha, our foreign policy has carried out with honour its national and international duties. The principled foreign policy of our country is also an experience and outstanding contribution of the PLA and Comrade Enver Hoxha to the development of Marxist-Leninist science of the international relations, to the development and elaboration of the revolutionary foreign policy of the international proletariat. Comrade Enver Hoxha has said: "Our policy is in accordance with the interests of the peoples and not of the cliques and ideologies that suppress these peoples. It is not a policy of conjuncture, but a policy of proletarian principles. It does not emerge from the secret behind the scene diplomacy, from the mysterious negotiations, it does not put into auction the interests of its country and other countries."

LOANS, CREDITS LEAD TO 'BONDAGE'

AU281137 Tirana ATA in English 0940 GMT 28 Dec 84

["Socialism Is Not Built and Defended With Imperialist Aids--Article of the Newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT"--ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, 28 Dec (ATA)--Under this title the newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT carries today an article, written by Arshin Rushaj, which says among the other things:

In order to draft the correct line to solve the two most fundamental tasks, the liberation of the country and the construction of new Albania our party since the very beginning was based in the first place on the strength and inexhaustible energies of the people whom it mobilized and led from one battle to the other.

The Party of Labour of Albania has never confounded the internationalist aids among the genuine socialist countries with the enslaving aids of imperialism, social imperialism and their followers. Our people have been and are for the sincere and free aids, because they have had and have the generosity in their nature. It is historically known the aid it has given to the other peoples, sending its sons to fight and shed blood for their freedom and independence.

At the same time it has not been and is not in the nature of the Albanian people to ask for alms or that for the sake of some so-called aids be kneeled or sold out the freedom and independence of their country. So, it revealed longside what was hidden behind the so-called offers for aids by the Anglo-Americans through which they aimed at nipping in the bud the new socialist Albania. That is why it rejected them.

Our party and people have been and are also against the so-called aids such as those of the revisionists through which they have seen their attempts to plunder and subjugate Albania and to impose on our party their anti-Marxist line. They have not only exposed these kinds of aids, but they have also denounced them publicly because "as life proved, although they were given under the guise of proletarian internationalism, Comrade Enver Hoxha stresses on occasion of the 40th anniversary of the liberation, in essence they had an enslaving imperialist character."

The Albanian people curbed once and for all the appetite of the imperialist plunderers since the congress of Permet and they have sanctioned their will by constitution on the basis of which in our country it is prohibited the granting of concessions, the activity of foreign companies and economic and financial institutions, the obtaining of credits and loans from the capitalist and revisionist states.

The vital importance of this policy and these unwavering principled stands of our party for the fates of our country and people becomes clear if we make the small comparison with the present day situation of the capitalist and revisionist countries which are under the bondage of dollar and the ruble. They are forced to give way to the American pressures to the extent that they allow the deployment of new American nuclear missiles, which pose a serious danger to the freedom loving of the entire world. [sentence as received] A common characteristic for all these countries which are plunged in debts is that they are actually in the grip of one of the most profound and gravest crisis in their history. They ask constantly for new debts in order to pay off the old ones, as Yugoslavia, Poland, Brazil and many other countries do which are at the mercy of the creditors, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, etc.

The enslaving nature of these debts can be clearly understood if we just draw attention to the fabulous profits that the international financial oligarchies draw from the high interest rates which they put on the loans granted to the debtors. This oligarchy, which fattens on this money, robs the undeveloped countries of more than 80 billion dollars a year in the shape of interest rates.

Through the system of loans, the imperialist bourgeoisie has perfected and intensified even more the savage plunder made of the various peoples and countries of the world. This plunder is so unscrupulous and with such grave consequences, that countries with big assets find themselves today on the eve of financial bankruptcy or have reached such a level of degradation that they have put their energy resources under the complete control of the imperialist banks, because they have no means to pay off the debts which are suffocating them.

In fact the obtaining of debts and credits opens the way to an even greater economic dependence and political and military ones as well, because the dollars that are obtained are accompanied by the "invitations" for the visits of American or Soviet warships, the "permissions" for the construction of military bases, the deployment of troops and atomic weapons of the superpowers.

The Party of Labour of Albania not only has guaranteed our people the development of an economy without foreign debts and with an unshakeable stability but it has also publicly denounced the enslaving nature of the imperialist aids. The profound and all-sided analysis that Comrade Enver Hoxha has made of neocolonialism applied by the big imperialist powers after World War II to enslave the peoples show clearly what it represents, what great dangers it poses to the peoples all over the world. These analyses, rich in conclusions, clearly reflect the correct line of our party in defence of the aspirations and struggles of the peoples to throw away the neocolonialist yoke and achieve their national and social liberation.

OPPRESSED PEOPLES STRUGGLE AGAINST REACTION IN 1984

AU021331 Tirana ATA in English 0745 GMT 2 Jan 85

["The National Liberation Struggles--Expression of the Anti-imperialist Peoples Hatred--Savage Attack of the Imperialist Superpowers Against the National Liberation Movements of the Oppressed Peoples"--ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, 2 Jan (ATA)--The front of the national liberation and anti-imperialist struggles of the oppressed and exploited peoples against imperialism, social-imperialism and reaction during 1984 too assumed great proportions, everywhere where there is war for freedom and national independence, in Asia and in the Middle East, in Africa and Latin America there is an enhancement of the fighting spirit, maturity and a high political consciousness.

The Middle East continues to be a hotbed of the struggle of the Arab peoples and especially of the Palestinian people against Zionism and U.S.-led imperialism for the liberation of the national territory occupied by Israel. Due to the armed resistance of the people, Afghanistan is becoming ever more a place in which the Soviet social-imperialists and their servants of Kabul are feeling the ground sliding under their feet. Central America especially Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala are seething with struggle and hatred of the people against yankee imperialism and its puppet dictatorships. In other countries too such as Namibia, Northern Ireland, Philippines, Chile, the peoples have taken up arms fighting to realize their national and social aspirations.

Both imperialist superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, during the year that has just gone out, were engaged directly in oppressing the national liberation movements going on in different countries and regions of the world. To this end, known arsenal of means and methods, such as the tactics of scorched land, pressures, diplomatic dictates and combinations were used. The U.S. imperialists, who have not respected even the most elementary norms of the international law, in the name of the security of the vital interests of the U.S. occupied Grenada and planted mines in the ports of Nicaragua. The Soviet social imperialists applied the rich aggressive and occupying experience in Afghanistan. The mass extermination and the genocide of the Soviet occupiers led to the change of the demographic map of the country. Over 4 million Afghan people have left the country, another 2 million have gone away from the fighting zones and have rushed in the cities. The military aids for the puppet regimes

and the aggressive countries have taken an important place in all the imperialist strategy of the United States and the Soviet Union in order to oppress the national liberation struggles.

The superpowers and other imperialist powers have launched a fierce attack against the national liberation movements of the oppressed peoples in the ideological plane as well. Today, the bourgeois revisionist neocolonialist views, which present the anti-imperialist national liberation struggles as struggles with religious character, such as the revolt of the backward and undeveloped peoples are widespread. Through these preachings it is aimed at denigrating the character of these movements, at masking their real class nature, the anti-imperialist tendency as well as the savage and double oppression and exploitation that weighs down on these peoples. Now the new imperialist and social imperialist occupiers, in order to continue the plunder and oppression, instead of sword use the guns and instead of bibles the demagogic preachings on peace and aids. The gloomy tableaux of hunger and deaths on mass prevailing in different countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America are testimony to their alleged attempts to help the undeveloped countries are fighting because they cannot endure the imperialist yoke and savage oppression, the unscrupulous plundering of their national assets and the merciless neocolonialist exploitation.

Defining the character of these struggles Comrade Enver Hoxha has stressed that the national liberation wars of the peoples, the blood of the peoples fighting for their freedom and independence reflect the hatred and indignation against the capitalist exploitation and the imperialist yoke. The national liberation struggles of the oppressed peoples are actually facing with the most regressive **forces of the time, with the two superpowers and other imperialist powers and** with their reactionary tools. But despite the difficulties and hindrances they will meet, the armed liberation struggle of the Palestinian, Afghan, Namibian, Salvadorian, North Irish Peoples, etc., will triumph, because they are fighting for a just vital cause, for freedom, national independence, and social progress.

CSO: 2020/40

ALBANIA

ANNIVERSARY OF STALIN'S BIRTH MARKED

AU211016 Tirana ATA in English 0900 GMT 21 Dec 84

[Text] Tirana, 21 Dec (ATA)--In order to commemorate the 105th anniversary of the birth of J. V. Stalin, the great Marxist-Leninist, loyal friend and worthy follower of the immortal deed of V. I. Lenin, numerous activities such as jubilee meetings, talks, visits to museums, etc., were organized in different districts of the country.

A jubilee meeting was organized in the higher party school "V. I. Lenin" on the revolutionary life and activity of J. V. Stalin. On 21 December the party committee of the No 2 region and the party committee of the "Stalin" textile mill organized a jubilee meeting in the Cino-Club of this mill on the activity of J. V. Stalin as a great proletarian internationalist, outstanding leader of the world communist movement.

Such activities were organized in schools, etc. Numerous visitors from different economic enterprises, the University of Tirana, army units have visited the "V. I. Lenin-J. V. Stalin" museum. (The working people of the museum have conducted talks on this outstanding strategist. On occasion of this anniversary, talks were conducted in schools and work centers in Skhoder district on Comrade Enver Hoxha's book "With Stalin" (memoirs). The folk museum opened the exhibition with photos from the revolutionary activity of Stalin, etc.

"The PLA and Comrade Enver Hoxha, loyal defenders of the figure and revolutionary deed of J. V. Stalin" was the topic of the talks conducted with working people of "Telat Noga" cigarette factory and in other work centers in Durrës. A topical party was organized on this occasion also in "Alexander Mossiu" Palace of Culture.

Such activities were organized in other districts of the country, too.

CSO: 2020/40

ALBANIA

MYFTIU SPEAKS AT ATA ANNIVERSARY MEETING

AU280841 Tirana ATA in English 0730 GMT 28 Dec 84

[Text] Tirana, 28 Dec (ATA)--Forty years are completed since, under the leadership of the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha personally, the Albanian Telegraphic Agency was created as an official agency of the new Albanian state, as one of the most vanguard units of the party propaganda in and outside the country. In order to mark this event, a jubilee meeting was organised yesterday afternoon in the capital.

Attending were former working people and ex-journalists of ATA, its working people, collaborators and voluntary correspondents, representatives of the central organs of the press and radio-television and other invitees.

Present were also the member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers Comrade Manush Myftiu, the members of the Central Committee of the party, Comrade Nexhmije Hoxha and Comrade Sofokli Lazri, the chief of the press sector at the Central Committee of the party Dhimiter Tona, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT, Arshin Xherzo, the chairman of the Journalists' Union of Albania, Marash Hajati and other comrades.

The meeting was declared open by the vice-directoress of ATA, Liljana Hoxha.

Comrade Manush Myftiu greeted on behalf of the Central Committee of the party, the Council of Ministers and the beloved leader of our party and people, Comrade Enver Hoxha. The Albanian Telegraphic Agency, he stressed among others, was created immediately after the liberation of the country as the main information organ of our country and was consolidated during the years of the people's state power, under the constant solicitude of the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha. As a spokesman of the party and our new state, during these 40 years it has played an important role for the all-round reflection of the correct Marxist-Leninist line of the party and of the brilliant reality of socialist Albania. The Albanian Telegraphic Agency has constantly reflected every success and victory of our people in the construction and defence of socialism. Its reports have nourished every day our people's press and have inspired the working masses for magnificent battles. They are living chronicles of our free life won through blood and countless sacrifices, in struggle against the internal and external enemies, they are annals of our people's revolution guided with wisdom by the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha, which have incalculable values for the present and the future generations.

In our time, Comrade Manush Myftiu continued, the tasks of our press have become greater and all-sided. As a vanguard unit of the party propaganda the Albanian Telegraphic Agency has a great and important mission to reflect this titanic struggle waged by our people and party for the construction of socialism and the defence of Marxism-Leninism in all its aspects. After pointing out some tasks facing ATA with regard to the propaganda within and outside the country, Comrade Manush Myftiu underlined that the works of Comrade Enver Hoxha, which reflect the correct line of our party, its struggle against imperialism and revisionism, the rich experience of our people for the construction and defence of socialism, are real treasure for the Marxist-Leninists and the revolutionary peoples all over the world. The high prestige of the ATA reports have their basis in the Marxist-Leninist truth that our party defends consistently.

I express my conviction that your collective, editors, translators, correspondents, photographers, radiographers and technicians, and all the other working people, Comrade Manush Myftiu said in conclusion, will always honourably perform the tasks set by the party in this important sector of its propaganda.

Those present applauded and enthusiastically acclaimed for our glorious party of labour and the beloved leader of the party and people, the founder of our people's press Comrade Enver Hoxha.

Then, the director of the Albanian Telegraphic Agency Taqo Zoto made the speech on the occasion. He stressed the 40 year long road of this institution, its constant growth and development under the special care of the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha.

A message of greetings was sent from the meeting to the first secretary of the Central Committee of the party, Comrade Enver Hoxha.

A photo exhibition was opened on the occasion prepared by the photographers of the Albanian Telegraphic Agency.

CSO: 2020/40

MARKO, MISKA, ASLLANI AT PIONEERS CELEBRATIONS

AU011442 Tirana ATA in English 0730 GMT 31 Dec 84

[Text] Tirana, 31 Dec (ATA)--On occasion of the people's festival of New Year, a big topical festival party was organized in the Partizani Palace of Sports in the capital yesterday. Present were thousands of little children and outstanding pioneers as well as parents, teachers and other invitees.

Attending were also the member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and vice-president of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, Comrade Rita Marko; the alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and first secretary of the party committee of the district, Foto Cami; the secretary of the Central Committee of the party, Comrade Vangjel Cerrava; the minister of education and culture, Tefta Cami; the president of the General Council of Trade Unions, Sotir Kocollari; the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Union of Working Youth, Mehmet Elezi; and other comrades.

The pioneers and little children expressed during this nice festival the ardent love and boundless gratitude for the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha for the happy days in our socialist homeland. The little artists of the Pioneers Palace and the houses of pioneers in the quarters gave animation to this party through their joyful songs and dances. Those present applauded the song "When I Embraced Uncle Enver," etc.

In Fier too, the party of the new year was organized in which 250 most outstanding pioneers in lessons and other, out of school activities took part.

Attending were the member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and first secretary of the party committee of the district.

Then the musical performance "We Are Growing Up Happily Under the Care of the Party" was given and songs and dances were performed.

About 200 outstanding pioneers and little children of Durres District passed full of joy the New Year party organized in Pimetori Palace of Sports. Present at this beautiful party was also the member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and first secretary of the party committee of the district, Comrade Muho Asslani, and other comrades.

The children manifested their achievements in lessons and dances and song to new and happy life under the care of the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha.

In other districts of the country, too, such festive parties were organized in which outstanding pioneers and little children, etc., took part.

CSO: 2020/40

ALBANIA

AWP PAPER MARKS CAMBODIA'S NATIONAL DAY

AU061441 Tirana ATA in English 0755 GMT 6 Jan 85

["Day of Celebration for the Cambodian People--Article of ZERI I POPULLIT"--ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, 6 Jan (ATA)--January 7 is the National Day for the Cambodian people. The newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT stresses among others: Years ago they overthrew the odious regime of the criminal gang of Pol Pot, which made the most inhuman massacres and genocide against the Cambodian people and was embarking that country on the road of destruction and complete misery. Since the day of the overthrow of this criminal anti-national gang, the Cambodian people set to work for the construction of the country destroyed by the many years long war.

Further on ZERI I POPULLIT underlines that the Albanian people have followed always with sympathy, have supported and backed up powerfully the struggle of the Cambodian people against imperialism and reaction and their construction work. The crimes of U.S. imperialism and of the local tools are denounced by the Albanian people resolutely. They have exposed also the inhuman and bloody actions of the antipeople clique of Pol Pot and their foreign supporters, who through their unprecedented genocide caused sufferings and great misery for the Cambodian people. The Albanian people and the Government of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania have supported and backed up the People's Republic of Cambodia on the international arena as well. They have asked that the Cambodian Government take its legitimate place in the UNO and throw away the Pol Pot clique kept there through the aid of U.S. imperialism and world reaction. The Albanian people overjoyed [as received] sincerely over every success the Cambodian people have attained in consolidating the political and economic stability of the country's life, in improving the ruined economy, etc.

On this day of celebration for the Cambodian people, the Albanian people send them the warm greetings and wishes for fresh successes on the road of consolidation of freedom and independence of the country in the all-round development of the national economy, and culture, etc., ZERI I POPULLIT writes in conclusion.

CSO: 2020/40

ALBANIA

HOXHA MESSAGE TO NEW YEAR WELL WISHERS

AU061418 Tirana ATA in English 0745 GMT 6 Jan 85

[From the "Press Review"]

[Excerpt] Tirana, 6 Jan (ATA)--The newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT and other newspapers carry today the message of thanks of Comrade Enver Hoxha, which says:

On occasion of the New Year 1985 numerous working collectives, individuals, friends, and comrades of war and the socialist construction from all parts of the country as well as compatriots from various countries of the world have sent me telegrams and letters of greetings.

I thank them all wholeheartedly for their feelings of love for the party the warm and cordial wishes and for the happy and inspiring tidings they sent me from different sectors of the construction of socialism. At the same time, through my thanks I convey to them by best wishes and congratulations for fresh and all-sided successes in all directions.

Under the wise, courageous and resolute leadership of our glorious Marxist-Leninist party, let us mobilize all the mental and physical forces to realize and overfulfill the tasks of the plan of 1985 which is the decisive year for the realization of all the 7th Five-Year Plan. Let us be prepared better than ever to fulfill the many tasks that the 8th Five-Year Plan, [word indistinct] sets before us.

Happy New Year 1985, dear comrades, brothers, sisters and honored friends. I wish you always fresh successes at work, good health joys and happiness in your families.

CSO: 2020/40

BRIEFS

NEW HOXHA WORKS--Tirana, 26 Dec (ATA)--The 43d volume of the works by Comrade Enver Hoxha came off the press. The volume contains materials of March-June 1970 period, most of which are published for the first time. Among the major materials of this volume are the theses for the free military schools, the discussions at the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party such as "The propaganda of the party make the people conscious, instigates and mobilizes them," "Let us powerfully rely on the creative thinking of the masses for the planning and increase of production," etc. The speech "Let's further enliven the life of youth organizations in schools," the speeches made during the visits in Luzi i Vogel, Durres District, and in the districts of Kukes, Tropoje, Puke and Vau i Dejes, articles published in the press, etc. [Text] [Tirana ATA in English 0900 GMT 26 Dec 84]

CSO: 2020/40

IDEOLOGICAL DIVERSION SAID TO BE MISSION OF FRG TV

East Berlin IPW BERICHTE in German No 10, Oct 84 pp 61-64

[Article by M. Klauss: "Television in the FRG and West Berlin"]

[Text] There are three television channels in the FRG.

Channel 1 of the FRG television is a community program of eight federal Laender broadcasting stations and the West Berlin Radio "Free Berlin" (SFB) linked together under the Working Party of the Broadcasting Stations under Public Law in West Germany (ARD). Channel 2 of the FRG television (ZDF) which is a central television organization is carried by the 10 Laender of the FRG and by West Berlin.

Both channels are broadcast throughout the FRG and West Berlin and into the GDR and western areas of CSSR via special transmitting facilities. This represents the two-fold mission of FRG television serving FRG imperialism; that is, the manipulation of its own population and the ideological sabotage against socialism. Its further impact is emphatically promoted and pursued by the FRG government. C.-D. Spranger, parliamentary under secretary of state in the FRG Ministry of the Interior which is also responsible for the coordination of policies regarding the media of the FRG government insisted, "More than ever before, the broadcasting system... should feel 'committed' to the value system of the Basic Law, especially in its television programs... And the political aspects regarding a unified Germany must not be forgotten. Moreover, the people in the GDR must preserve their opportunity to inform themselves through radio and television broadcasts from the FRG. The media must make their contribution to preserving the unity of the nation and keeping alive the feeling of solidarity."¹

The five stations constituting Channel 3 FRG television (Bayerisches Fernsehen, Hessisches Fernsehen, Nordkette, Sudwest 3 and Westdeutsches Fernsehen) are produced by an individual Land broadcasting station or by several together and are broadcast over a regional area. Even these stations professedly address themselves to viewers in the border areas of the CSSR and of the GDR, including its capital and surrounding areas.

The official commencement of the broadcasting of FRG television took place on December 25, 1952 with a program from the North West German Broadcasting System. However, pilot programs were being regularly received on November 27, 1950.

According to data from FRG media researchers, FRG television sets were turned on an average of 184 minutes per day in 1982. ARD received 82 of those minutes; ZDF, 81; Channel 3, 18; and foreign stations, 3. At the same time the number of television transmitters and television re-broadcasting stations numbered 5,628. Thus, almost 99 percent of all television households (at 21.5 million registered radios and television's) could be supported by the three television channels.²

ARD Community Program, "German TV"

The ARD channel has been broadcasting since November 1, 1954. Its legal basis is the Laender agreement of April 17, 1959³ on the coordination of the Channel 1 programming in which the broadcasting stations of the Laender committed themselves to the joint production of Channel 1 and laid out the organizational framework: the appointment of a program director, planning of the community program in regularly scheduled conferences, formation of a program advisory board, as well as the administrative arrangement by the FRG Laender broadcasting stations on cooperation in television (television contract) of March 27, 1953⁴. This contract regulates the organization of ARD television and⁵ contains provisions on every broadcaster's share in the community program. The contingent quotas in percentages are as follows: Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR) 25; Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR) 19; Bayerischer Rundfunk (BR) 17; Suedwestfunk (SWF); Hessischer Rundfunk (HR) and Sueddeutscher Rundfunk (SDR) each 8; Radio Bremen (RB) and Saarlaendischer Rundfunk (SR) each 3. Added to this is SFB's 8 percent.⁶ Each station is responsible for the contributions it produces.

The Standing Programming Conference which meets six times yearly determines the television programming from the broadcasting stations' proposals. The conference is attended by the program director of "Deutsches Fernsehen" who acts as chairman (D. Schwarzkopf, CDU, has held this position since 1978.), as well as the station manager of the ARD stations (currently five members of the CDU/CSU, two members of the SPD and two formally unaffiliated) of their representatives. Resolutions are passed by a simple majority. The chairman decides in the case of a tie. The television advisory board which consists of a representative from each of the ARD stations advises the members of the Standing Programming Conference.

Under the direction of the program director, program management with headquarters in Munich conducts the business of Channel 1. In particular, the program management prepares the sessions of the Standing Programming Conference and coordinates the activity of its subcommittees. Each of these committees is led by a coordinator of the program management. The function of the coordinators for politics, society and culture is especially significant.

The coordination of the television programs between the ARD stations is taken care of by the conferences of the chief editors or the program directors, the operational conferences of the station managers or the program directors (once a week if required) as well as the daily operational conference of the chief editors in which programs are reviewed and the composition of the news report "Tagesthemen" is prepared? ©

Each station decides whether a program from the community program is broadcast in its own area or not. The Bayerischer Rundfunk uses this opportunity in particular as a means of bearing pressure on moderators and programs that do not wholly represent the conservative line, e.g., the BR is against the topical cabaret program "Scheibenwischer" [windshield wiper] with D. Hildebrandt.

The ARD main programming time slot is 8 to 12 PM/1 AM. Weekdays a morning program is produced in cooperation with the ZDF between 10 AM and 1:15 PM. It links up with a so-called family program in the afternoons (on Sundays as early as 9:15 AM). Regional programs in lieu of the ARD community program are usually broadcast weekdays between 6 and 8 PM). Television advertising is imbedded in these regional programs and totals 20 minutes per workday on a yearly average. Together the ARD and the ZDF have been offering a video-text service from 10 AM their sign-off ever since June 1, 1984. Earlier this service ran for two years as a pilot program.

In 1982, the average daily program production was 8 hours, 35 minutes. Of this time, 95.1 percent was broadcast in color. Contentwise, the program divided up into 51.5 percent informational broadcasts, 29.7 percent game shows, 10.5 percent entertainment as number broadcasts, 4 percent program cutovers, 2.5 percent music broadcasts, and 1.8 percent miscellaneous. Original broadcasts constituted 77.4 percent; individually produced broadcasts, 51.5 percent.¹⁰

The Degeto-Film GmbH firm with headquarters in Frankfurt (Main) is responsible for locating, purchasing, and evaluating the ARD's films and television productions. The ARD stations or their advertising companies decide on Degeto's shares in the partnership. At the beginning of 1984 it transacted "the largest purchase of feature films in the history of German television" at a cost of 220 million DM. This purchase included the German broadcasting rights for 1,350 older Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer/United Artists films and lot for at least 10 new films per year for the next 15 years.¹¹ The underlying motivation for this deal is the effort to stock up on films itself a film reserve for the competition against the upcoming cable tv. "There are only about 500 films remaining for the future private competition,"¹² summed up a FRG newspaper. At the same time this films purchase means a further Americanization of the FRG television programs.

Television fees (16.25 DM monthly) constitute about 70 percent of the financing of Channel 1. Together the ARD and ZDF draw on these fees through their central fees collection office of the broadcasting stations

under public law (GEZ) which is active in Cologne. In 1982 the respective share of the ARD was 1,561.7 million DM. About 20 percent of the total revenue come from the commercial television. In 1982 this amount was 746.2 million DM.¹³ The ARD receives allocations intended especially to aggravate the ideological class struggle. It receives these (among others) from the Central Office for Political Education which is directed by the FRG Ministry of the Interior.

Even for its television productions within the ARD, the SFB receives contributions from the budgets of the West Berlin Senate and the FRG Ministry for "Inner German Relations." Besides this, the SFB is subsidized by the ARD stations on the basis of the September 20, 1973 Laender treaty. The minimum amount which was established in 1973 with this treaty was 28 million DM. Coming into effect on July 1, 1983, this minimum was increased to 64.58 million DM in order to increase the subversive character of the SFB even further.¹⁴ This broadcasting mission was confirmed shortly thereafter by O. Hennig, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State in the FRG Ministry for "Inner German Relations." He said, "Within the ARD the SFB has...a special obligation to the German political situation in addition to its mission for and beyond (West) Berlin because of its position."¹⁵

Channel 1 is based on one of the largest foreign correspondents networks in the world. The ARD is continuously accredited in 26 locations.¹⁶ Together with travel and special correspondents, the permanent representatives also take on strategic missions in the interest of the controlling forces of the FRG and West Berlin which go far beyond their journalistic tasks. This was apparent among other things during the counter revolutionary events in the People's Republic of Poland when the Warsaw ARD correspondent, P. Gatter, was promoted by the FRG press to "Solidarity Reporter."¹⁷ The press said, "No other television reporter in the world was as quick as he to the hot spot...no one reported so vividly, so penetratingly." According to the then chief editor of "ARD-aktuel," this was only possible "with certain logistics."¹⁸ Gatter was distinguished with the "Golden Camera" award by the Springer firm for his reportage.

The ARD is technically very well equipped. Its television programming is broadcast in the FRG by 69 parent transmitters (NDR 17, BR 14, SWF 12, WDR 7, HR and SDR 8 each, RB and SR 1 each). Seven of them, installed at the eastern border and like the others increasing their influence through satellite transmitters, are active against the GDR. In addition to these stations is the SFB television station in West Berlin. Three stations near the Czechoslovakian border broadcast into the CSSR.¹⁹ Right-wing forces such as the FRG Minister for "Inner German Relations," H. Windelen, attempt to justify this targeted interference with nationalistic arguments and the imperialistic thesis of an alleged "free flow of information, ever over the border."²⁰ Committed to this bourgeois class mission, the ARD is currently emphatically striving to broadcast its own satellite program over the telecommunications satellites TV-Sat which transmit directly. This program is intended to become operational as of 1986.²¹

Ideological Sabotage Against GDR and CSSR

Since its inception, the FRG television has had the mission to continually influence the citizens of the GDR and the viewers in CSSR and to develop antisocialist attitudes. For this purpose forms of ideologic sabotage which are embedded in the ARD programming and are conceived for their long term influence are predominant. Nevertheless, the direct intervention and the unabashed lies were not at any time rejected. Thus, the ARD newsbroadcast "Tagesschau," which first appeared on December 26, 1952 and intermittently in the programming thereafter, began its daily broadcast on October 1, 1956 - exactly at the height of the counter revolution in the Hungarian People's Republic. The intention of the broadcast was to trigger "simultaneous processes" in the GDR through "comprehensive information."²²

All broadcasts of FRG television make their own specific contribution towards ideological sabotage against the socialist neighboring states, especially against the GDR.

The overall programming is aimed at masking the reactionary and aggressive character of imperialism. The threatening anti-communist lies and solemn demagogic declarations of peace about NATO and the Reagan course thereby stand at present in the center. The continuing conflicts between the competing imperialistic politicians or interest groups are strongly featured as expressions of "true democracy" and recommended to socialism as alternatives to socialism's alleged "totalitarian" system.

Newsbroadcasts and the political television reports are supposed to give political indifferents and multipliers "discussion aids" through biased commentary and background information.

In 1968 the FRG was involved in the distribution of revisionistic and counterrevolutionary pamphlets from CSSR. The political television report "Kontraste" was established under the control of the SFB. Supposedly this television program objectively reports on issues of the socialistic commonwealth and the communist world movement. Actually however, information from socialist or developing countries is reduced for the most part to unsolved problems and difficulties which are supposed to impart and stir up the overall impression of dissatisfaction and insecurity. In evaluating the coverage of the People's Republic of Poland, even the conservative paper "Rheinische Merkur/Christ und Welt" had to admit that "some of the alleged crises in Poland are much less critical than the ARD would lead us to believe."²³

Additional ARD political broadcasts ("Report" by BR or from SWF; "Panorama" by NDR; "Monitor" and, since the middle of 1953!, "Der internationale Fruehschoppen" from WDR, and "Weltspiegel" carried by varying stations) similarly attempt to disguise their subversive intentions. But they expose themselves continually in that they encourage enemies of the socialist social order as "chief witnesses" against the actual existing socialism, or rather, they offer them a wide propaganda platform for anti-communist attacks.

The feature films and television documentaries are increasingly incorporated into the program for political or historical background. The intended effect is illustrated in the words of a former ARD program director. He said, "A television play remains responsible, a piece of information that is too strong loses its meaning."²⁴

The broadcasts which are committed to the imperialist human rights demagogy or are exalted in attacks on the GDR state border take on a particular rank order. Militant anti-communistic and anti-Soviet cues have increasingly been written even recently with the infamous comparison of fascism and socialism on the basis of the totalitarian doctrine, e.g., through the multi-installment broadcast "Flucht und Vertreibung" from BR which falsifies most maliciously the stipulations of the Allies in the Potsdam Treaty.

In entertainment broadcasts expressly "citizens from the other part of Germany and from CSSR" are greeted on the screen as if they were welcome "lookers-on." They were even urged by one host "to play along as fellow participants."²⁵ Game shows and feature films propagate bourgeois moral concepts (e.g., "Alles oder Nichts" [all or nothing] or the US television series "Dallas"). "Global candor" is demonstratively used to buoy false hopes (such as "Einer wird gewinnen" [one person will win]). Formerly artists and persons involved in the cultural sector living in the GDR or CSSR were targeted to arouse the demand for more "freedom of movement" in the socialist countries.

Likewise the forced travel and vacation reports which consciously conceal the fact that the FRG's citizens' chances for rest and recuperation are becoming more and more limited because of their increasing social insecurity. At the same time open nationalistic attitudes are supposed to be incited by such broadcasts over various areas of the GDR. This is illustrated for example by the award to the WDR television documentary "Wanderungen durch die DDR - Entlang der Saale" [walks through GDR - along the banks of the Saale]. In the FRG's Minister for "Inner German Relations," H. Windelen's testimonial to this documentary, he stated that the broadcast presented "German-German common ground."²⁶

Commercial television consciously makes advertisements for the capitalistic system as a "consumer society" and its models. It attempts to manufacture constant dissatisfaction over life under socialism. Television commercials must, according to a FRG commission, become one of the most important factors of Western presence in the East, since it favors the "maintenance of an attitude of reunification."²⁷

On September 4, 1961 the ARD began broadcasting a morning program that would "allow especially the shift workers in the GDR to participate in Channel 1 programs."²⁸ It is only carried by the SFB and NDR broadcasting stations and those broadcasting stations near the border, BR and HR. It was not by chance that it was close proximity in time to August 13, 1961. The ARD chairman at the time admitted, "These morning broadcasts for the

GDR were originally planned for a later date, but in view of the political situation, we began immediately with the broadcasts."²⁹ However, for the most part, shift workers in the FRG had to do without this service until 1981 because of "financial reasons."

Although the morning program is now broadcast throughout the FRG, it has not changed its style for GDR viewers. Then as now, it contains primarily political information broadcasts and reports on the "East-West Issues" which are embedded in the conversation.

SFB has editorial responsibility for the program. Since 1966, the ZDF has also participated in the morning program.

The ARD scheduling is rigidly organized. Even without a guide, such standard broadcasts should be easy to find for viewers in the GDR and in CSSR. In 1975 the ARD doubled its program previews in order to give those viewers "the chance to take notes."³⁰

As of January 1, 1984, a new program schedule went into effect which increases the attractiveness of Channel 1, and it should thereby live up to its mission of sabotage even better. Lengthier and better places were arranged for political and topical key broadcasts, the majority in the prime broadcasting time. Furthermore, they should be "even more strongly accentuated"³¹ in substance.

Cultural themes received just one broadcasting slot weekly, up until now biweekly. Religious broadcasts are a permanent part of the program. Youth, a main target group of the ideologic sabotage, is supposed to be addressed more strongly than ever through special programs and through an integration of subjects specific to youth in programs. The ARD coordinator for family programming, H.-W. Conrad, explained, "the selections will deal with all questions and problems which affect youth and are important to them: future expectations and fears of life, hit parades and star cults, problems with relationships and religious questions, sports and environmental protection, television programs and the armed forces, drug addiction and leisure time activities, as well as current issues which interest youth in particular."³²

Expansion of the Conservative Influence

Especially through the ARD broadcasting stations, the government exerts an influencing control over Channel 1. Thus the broadcasting station is at the center of "recommendations" for programming, as well as influencing personal political decisions, and various forms of discipline for editorial coworkers. In 1980 on the occasion of the ARD's 30th anniversary, Helmut Schmidt, then Federal Chancellor of the FRG, urged, "Broadcasting under public law must not keep us at a distance in our common state. Much more, it must serve the free parliamentary democracy."³³

Such demands have been increasingly reported after the change in government in 1982. Thus explains H. Kohl, FRG Federal Chancellor, "It is now our task

to lay out the political framework for tomorrow's media regulation...the institutions under public law are responsible to the public. They are not authorized to institute their monopoly on the maintenance of their own interests."³⁴

Bestowing their weight, the prevailing powers of the FRG support current efforts to broadcast programs by private capitalist promoters. "If the CDU and CSR march today at the head of the supporters of cable tv, then it is not in the least because they expect political support from the camp of the future television promoters."³⁵

In the middle of 1983 under the direction of the acting government spokesman J. Sudhoff, a working group of representatives of the FRG's Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defense was formed which formulated special "arguments" against the peace movement and influenced journalists respectively. Their goal was formulated as such, "the peace movement should be considered violent and directed by communists."³⁶ A German Press and Information Office list of measures stipulates the following for the propaganda campaign to "justify" the NATO heavy build-up of arms: strive "on all available levels of contact" to have partisans of the government policies appear increasingly in the broadcasting stations. "It is necessary to establish an early warning system that teaches program planning on a timely basis, so that appropriate participants may be available for discussion."³⁷

In the case of the SFB, the CDU took advantage of the balance of power in West Berlin that has changed since 1982 in order to oust SPD station managers and fill this function with L. Loewe who, as a correspondent, was called back from Moscow in 1970 because of his anti-communist smear campaign and in 1976 was expelled from the GDR. In view of the "permanent threatening interference by the station managers in especially critical broadcasts," the governing board of directors of the Radio-Television-Film Union (REFU) in April 1984 expressed their fear that through Loewe "the SFB is should be brought in line with the government's course one year before the elections of the representatives."³⁸

Similar interferences in the ARD are a common observable tendency. At the end of 1983, SWF station manager, W. Hilf, (CDU) showed hostility to the bourgeois-democratic opinions that were expressed by television journalists and delivered a censure, "What's needed is a certain self-censorship." He continued in that vein with his coworkers at the station.³⁹

The events surrounding E. Gruber, chief editor of the joint new editorial "ARD-aktuell" in Hamburg where the "Tagesschau" and "Tagesthemen" are produced, are also characteristic. Through the predominance of CDU and CSU in the Standing Programming Conference, he was brought into office in 1981. Since October 1, 1983, he has been the only person responsible for both programs. In 1983 the FRG press described him, "He is above all a man of the right. The conflict of 1981 when (in the "Tagesschau" at Gruber's suggestion - ed.) Reagan's decision to build the neutron bomb was not supposed to be termed "controversial" and Gruber cut off an ARD correspondent from Moscow with the

reasoning that nothing comes from there but propaganda material irritating to the public - yes, that has shown what really matters. 'Threatening critical colleague's remains now as ever before on the list of complaints of the 'Tagesschau' viewers."⁴⁰

But in spite of various protests, even from those who have already been concerned with the efficiency of this editor for other diverse reasons, Chief Schwarz-Schilling, acting in his capacity as Postmaster General and veteran chairman of the coordinating committee on the media policies of the CDR and CSU, asked for the floor in June 1983 and "preemptorily demanded that the station manager extend Gruber's contract...In-house, it was already clear at this point that one could scarcely get rid of Gruber without provoking a large to-do from the Unionists and the conservative journalists."⁴¹

FOOTNOTES

1. BULLETIN, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bonn, October 26, 1983.
2. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, Frankfurt (Main), July 12, 1983; DIE WELT, Bonn, December 16, 1983; DIE ZEIT, Hamburg, December 30, 1983.
3. "ARD-Jahrbuch 70," Hamburg, 1970, p 311.
4. "Ebenda", p 312; "ARD-Jahrbuch 78," Hamburg, 1978, p 290.
5. "ARD-Jahrbuch 83," Hamburg, 1983, p 227.
6. "Internationales Handbuch fuer Rundfunk und Fernsehen 1982/83," Hamburg, 1982, p C72.
7. DIE WELT, June 9, 1980.
8. HANDELSBLATT, Duesseldorf, January 29/30, 1982; SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Muenchen, January 29, 1982.
9. "Internationales Handbuch..." op. cit., p C75; SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, September 25/26, 1982; FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, March 16, 1984.
10. "ARD-Jahrbuch 83" op. cit., p 380.
11. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, February 15, 1984.
12. DIE WELT, March 17/18, 1984.
13. "ARD-Jahrbuch 83" op. cit., pp 308, 347; DER TAGESSPIEGEL, Westberlin, December 23, 1983.
14. "ARD-Jahrbuch 74," Hamburg, 1974, p 317; "ARD-Jahrbuch 83," op. cit., p 349.

15. BULLETIN, September 2, 1983.
16. "ARD-Jahrbuch 83" op. cit. p 230ff.
17. HOERZU, Hamburg, August 1981.
18. HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT, Hamburg, August 28, 1980.
19. "Internationales Handbuch..." op. cit., p H57ff.
20. BULLETIN, February 17, 1984.
21. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, March 3, 1984.
22. DIE WELT, June 9, 1980.
23. RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT, Bonn, August 19, 1983.
24. FUNK-REPORT, Bonn, March 18, 1977.
25. HOERZU, March 1977.
26. DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, Cologne, February 1984.
27. L. Bisky, "Geheime Verfuehrer," Berlin, 1980, p 65.
28. "ARD-Jahrbuch 71," Hamburg, 1971, p 179.
29. HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT, September 25, 1961.
30. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, October 1, 1977.
31. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, December 30, 1983.
32. TV-COURIER, Wiesbaden, July 6, 1983.
33. BULLETIN, June 27, 1980.
34. BULLETIN, September 30, 1983.
35. DIE ZEIT, December 30, 1983.
36. DER SPIEGEL, Hamburg, July 4, 1983.
37. SPD-PRESSEDIENST, Bonn, August 23, 1983.
38. UNSERE ZEIT, Duesseldorf, April 14, 1984.
39. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, October 22, 1983.
40. DEUTSCHE VOLKSZEITUNG, Duesseldorf, July 7, 1983.
41. SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, July 1, 1983.

12348

CSO: 2300/157

COMPETITION SEEN ENHANCING MILITARY TRAINING

East Berlin VOLKSARMEE in German No 44, 1984 (signed to press 29 Oct 84) p 4

[Article by Lt Gen Heinz Handke, Inspector General of the National People's Army: "Socialist Competition Promotes Willingness to Excel and Combat Strength; Experiences and Discoveries in the Conduct of Competition and its Reflection Through the Specified Competition Directives"]

[Text] The great exertions of our army members, border troops, and civilian employees in the course of socialist competition during the 35th anniversary year of the GDR proved to be a worthy part of the mass initiative of our working people to strengthen our socialist fatherland at a time when peace is in peril. These efforts contributed markedly to further strengthening in combat power and readiness, achieving stable results in combat training, reliably fulfilling the tasks assigned in the support system, combat and border service, furthering effective economical activity, and, last but not least, achieving further progress in development of personality and the collective.

In various tests during the past training year, headquarters, branches, and units demonstrated their increased combat potential.

Within the army and navy preparations for the 35th GDR anniversary were also characterized by remarkable results in the championship movement and the competition for soldier decorations. Compared to the same period last year, the number of collective and individual championship titles rose significantly.

Socialist competition, firmly integrated into military life, combines the principle of a superior individual leadership with the initiative and creativity of army members, and with their desire to make the required contribution to a reliable defense of socialism at the side of their comrades in arms. The high competition results are expressions of both the ever more effective politico-ideological work of commanders, political organs and party and FDJ organizations, and of their improved experiences in meeting targets, standards and tasks fixed in competition directives. These directives have been tested in practical life and have been shown to be true guides for action. They have furthered the unity of the training process and competition organization, supported competitions and achievement

comparisons, youth initiatives, and the competition for military awards. In short, they have advanced the atmosphere of competition and achievement, and have established standards for the appeals by competition initiators through their troop-oriented, guiding, and demanding programs.

The realization that socialist competition is to be primarily implemented by units has more and more eliminated instances of routine and formalism. The conclusion arises that the generalization of competition experiences of advanced units and branches will gain further political importance. Now and in the future firm class position and ideological clarity, a high degree of political responsibility, and an aggressive party position in the struggle for the required standard of combat readiness are and will be in demand. Among the unshakeable trove of experiences made by the best collectives is the realization that optimum results on the way to military mastery are achieved when each individual knows his pros and cons. In spite of all the specific experiences of the collectives they all are based on a few important common points:

--Personnel are well informed of the tasks required for combat readiness and through a reliably performed politico-ideological work identify themselves with high demands and standards.

--The voluntarily assumed obligations are the result of constant political conversations, practical advice, and assistance by superiors. They are demanding but realistic, and must be justified and evaluated before the collective.

--The will and strength to achieve are motivated, called upon and furthered by the example and action of superiors and communists in the collectives and by the politico-ideological activities of social circles.

--Thanks to timely and public performance everyone is aware of the results and placing in socialist competition; improved achievement is recognized and assistance organized in case of shortcomings.

--The meaning and utility of the socialist competition are practically applied through effective combat training and good service organization. Such applicable experiences show--increased demands in socialist competition concern primarily increased demands on leadership. Their mastery is a continuous process. Experiences gained have given rise to many a suggestion to make the directives even more applicable to the practical requirements of troop service. Analysis, research, and discussions have led to clarifications of directives that will be implemented in the new training year.

First, there will be some changes in the championship movement. According to the wishes of numerous officers and warrant officer they may compete for the championship title provided they meet the requirements for the title, and their unit achieves the title of best unit while they serve as deputy company or platoon commanders. In the future battalions, like all units, will carry out the championship competition over the period of half a year on the basis of an appropriate competition program. Predominately excellent results in political and combat training have been made a condition for submitting outstanding troop units for the title of "best troop unit."

Second, some requirements for soldier awards have been clarified. It is affirmed that classification is without exception based on high military achievement. This has significance for the selection of classification-material positions and the contents of guidelines for achieving classification at the three levels of achievement. The official target regarding the appropriate level of classification may be exceeded either by an obligation to meet the target ahead of schedule, or by qualifying at a higher level.

In the case of the rifleman cord it is made clear that the listed criteria extend only to evaluated exercises, not to preparatory exercises, and that an acorn to the rifleman cord will be awarded for meeting the criteria during the three possible repetitions.

Requirements for the military sports insignia are now more flexible. They take into account that above average, but not universally excellent results are required. The introduction of achievement points for results obtained in the required events and the introduction of a minimum (9 or 12) of such achievement points increases the interest of more army members in participation in the training for the military sports insignia. Specific requirements have also been introduced for female competitors.

Third, the substantive orientation by officers of leadership organs regarding personal requirements will be expanded in line with the experiences made.

Fourth, there are improvements in the interest of greater training effectiveness. The successful mass controls in FDJ organizations have become an integral part of the competition, just as the justification of the achievements made during the competition period to immediate superiors in the presence of representatives of the public.

The implementation of creative competition in daily duties as a principal method is characterized by constant comparisons, man to man and collective to collective, under comparable starting positions. Its realization requires thorough preparation, especially of trainers. Not only achievements, but trends are to be depicted.

Further military regulations regarding the directives provide uniform guidance about the course of competition at military training facilities, and the summary and reporting of competition results. Thus the 17 September 1984 edition of the competition directives, enriched by practical troop experiences, represent and even more valuable basis for responsible administration of socialist competition in the new training year.

9240

CSO: 2300/162

ANTI-SEMITIC INCIDENTS DESCRIBED

Budapest VALOSAG in Hungarian No 8, Aug 84 pp 69-88

[Article by Peter Kende: "Jews Without Anti-Semitism? Anti-Semitism Without Jews?"]

[Text] Saturday evening, friends getting together, two married couples with a total of four children. While the kids carried on in the next room, they talked about Jews. Both members of the one couple were Jewish, neither of the other was. Not only did they all know this, they talked about it often too. Now, in 10 minutes, they told five stories from recent weeks--about the girlfriend of a Jewish physician who found a Star of David painted on her Trabant one morning, about children in general school who talked disparagingly about Jews and Gypsies, about the Jewish boss who would not take Jews in his department, about one of the universities where openly anti-Semitic steps had been taken, finally about the high state decoration for Prof Sandor Scheiber. The signal for the Saturday evening poem was given on the turned down TV, the striking face of a well-known actor appeared, and all of them broke out in laughter: "Oh, the poor kid, anyone who was not an anti-Semite before will be one after this!"

Later, during supper, one of the children, he had recently celebrated his fourth birthday, asked: "Daddy, do they call it a Zhiguli because it is Jewish?" The parents all pretended that they had not heard the question. Tea was offered with some confusion, and they loudly inquired what Pom-Pom had talked about. Other automobile trademarks were not mentioned that day.

When the guests went home and the Jewish couple had bathed the children and put them to bed, they sat down to talk about something both had been preparing for some time (it being December). Should they have a tree and presents at Christmas? What should they undertake and what not? And how should they do what they did? And how should they not do what they did not do? What should they say to the children in the nursery if they didn't? And what would they say to them 15 years hence if they did? What could and what must they give the children of themselves? In what is it possible to lie? Why? What were they afraid of? Can one even talk about such things today?

They quarreled, they went to bed, they slept--"and if they did not die they are living still."

Well, can one talk about such things?

Erik Molnar, the Marxist jurist and historian, said the following in a lecture titled "The Jewish Question in Hungary" given at the Political Academy of the Hungarian Communist Party in April 1946:

"We can sometimes still hear: There is no Jewish question in Hungary. Of course, those who say this are not so blind as not to see that there certainly was and still is a Jewish question in Hungary. They simply want to say that demagoguery has created the Jewish question artificially for political reasons. Without anti-Semitic propaganda no one would talk about the Jewish question in Hungary.

"Others call the Jewish question a 'delicate' question, with which it is not advisable to deal openly. Bringing the question up hurts sensitivities on one side and feeds anti-Semitic agitation on the other. So according to them it would be better to keep quiet about the whole thing.

"Both positions are incorrect. Anti-Semitism appears in various ages and countries with stubborn consistency. Mere trickery cannot stand behind such a phenomenon. Somehow it must be rooted in facts.

"There can be no doubting that the Jewish question has great political power. We know very well what a role the anti-Semitic propaganda had in the spread of fascism. We see also that reaction is again using anti-Semitism as a weapon against the young Hungarian democracy. Such a question must be talked about publicly. We must disperse the ignorance and prejudice which surrounds the question. We must discover the real roots of the Jewish question. Only thus can we block the path of anti-Semitic propaganda. And finally we must show how the Jewish question can be solved."¹

And 38 years later? Can we talk and write about this? According to many, no. Because, for example, it is not a problem today.

It is our impression that this problem has not yet ended. According to many it is better to be silent about it because everyone has a different opinion in the matter and everyone reacts much more nervously to a differing position than they do to other themes. This is probably true. But if this theme has become such a "neurotic" one then the only therapy may be frankness, to "talk it out." Repression can only make the situation worse. It is customary to note that the Jews are sensitive. This is true, but it should be added that every people or group with a hard and injured history is sensitive. Some say: Let us not open up wounds that have healed. But I believe these wounds have not completely healed, and new trauma is caused not by reticence but rather by the vexations and clashes of today. They also appeal to time who ask: Is it timely to write about it today? If the problem has not disappeared then it is always timely, but especially in 1984, when we must recall the 40th anniversary of what happened in 1944. And a reckoning with history is truly useful if at the same time we examine how far we have gotten from what we are recalling, what lessons we can draw from yesterday. Finally, there are those according to whom it is not

proper to write about it because there are no crystallized positions about the existence and especially about the prospects of the Jews. It is certainly dangerous to err greatly in this matter, but opinions cannot be cleared up without errors and debates. In addition, the articles of faith, worldview and situation analysis differences in this area may distance the various views so far from one another that they may never meet. But--so be it--everyone should defend his own opinion, especially if he receives with proper tolerance the opinion of others. I myself, when I try to write about the Jews and anti-Semitism, am certain of only one thing: I can do it only clumsily, making many mistakes, with the uncertain feeling that I am trying to break out of the vicious circle of silence, artificial silence and fear.

This essay also will attempt no more than to try to think through a few theses, actually in regard to one research hypothesis. It will necessarily involve a mixture of essay and scientific study, for to whatever extent I call on social psychology for help it must be recognized that in this matter there is no need for the sort of scientific popular writing as when no one knows anything about the matter. What must be noted is that everyone knows something, but most of it is wrong. So let us look for an answer to the questions of whether there are Jews in Hungary today, whether there is anti-Semitism, and do the Jews today have a "situation." The essay is not about the affairs of religious Jews; it does not contain factors and considerations which apply uniquely to religious Jews; to a certain extent these must be regarded as of a different character.

Are There Jews in Hungary?

Many reject raising the theme by saying that we have no Jews today. There were before the war, most of them were carried off and killed; most of those who survived did not come back and even those who did left Hungary thereafter, some before 1949 and some in 1956-1957. Those who did remain here are so assimilated that they no longer count as Jews from any viewpoint. According to others, there is no talk of assimilation; they can no more step over their own Jewishness than they could their own shadow.

Obviously the truth is between the two extreme positions.

But if we are to be able to answer the question of whether there are Jews in Hungary today, we must first clear up who is a Jew and what it means to be Jewish.

It is important to separate the two concepts--Jew and Jewry. Jews are concrete individuals who are Jews on the basis of religion or origin. Jewry, however, must also mean a system of relationships, contacts, cooperation, a sort of organization, Jews constitute a Jewry only if (as, for example, tree and forest or man and society) there are relationships among them which can distinguish them from others.

So who is a Jew? Somebody who looks like one? On the one hand, this would be a racial theory explanation but, on the other hand, it is impractical,

because such a collective concept would not include blond, blue-eyed, athletic Jews. Perhaps someone who claims to be a Jew? Where? When? On what occasion? There were times when the census asked this and recorded them accordingly, but today this is not asked and would give rise to great indignation if it were. Perhaps those are Jews who are considered to be so. By whom? On what basis? Even the Jews are not really able to do this. Kurt Lewin wrote in 1940: "Modern Jews are frequently uncertain in judging how and to what degree they belong in the Jewish groups. It has been especially difficult to positively define the character of the entire Jewish group since religion has become a less important social matter. A religious group with many atheists? Members of the Jewish race, with great differences in racial characteristics? A nation without a state or land which would contain the majority of its people? A group united by the same culture and traditions, but which at the moment includes the values and ideals, differing in many respects, of the nations in which the group lives?"²

The character of a group is determined by the strength and character of that boundary which separates this group from other groups. But this has changed! Today this boundary is primarily not between the Jewish group and others but rather between the Jewish individual and others. One looks for this boundary separating the Jewish individual; or one does not look for it, but sometimes one becomes aware of where it is.

The Jews are among those who used to be mentioned as a people without a homeland. The Jews are without a homeland only in regard to their Jewishness, and this is true even after the creation of Israel, for of the 15 million Jews in the world only 3.5 million live in Israel. What is unique in this is that they--at least the minority which moved to Israel--have re-created their language, culture and entire character as a people.

The Jews are a group whose interpretation and self-interpretation organically involves their own persecution. A person who tries to define himself as a Jew finds it difficult to start from anything else than the millennia of persecution. This is not some sort of the often-mentioned "Jewish hypersensitivity," it is a historical fact. Not only because the persecution is a fact but also because one of the conceptual elements in the survival of the Jews in the diaspora is probably the persecution of the Jews--however strange this may sound at first hearing.

It is generally true, but perhaps more so of the Jews than the average, that the chief criterion of belonging to a group is awareness of a common fate. Not something given by God or any other transcendental community of fate, for as Marx writes: "Jewry maintained itself not despite history but by virtue of history."³ A common fate of several thousand years can affect many things. The feeling of a common fate can be produced not only, perhaps not primarily, by the pressure of history but rather much more by the common fate of the present situation. Is there such a thing today? If there is anti-Semitism then there is a sort of common fate. Even if the Jews only hypothesize that they are surrounded by anti-Semitism this too can create a feeling of a common fate--an awareness which exists whether true or false. In Eastern Europe there is a tendency for the

various examples of communal awareness to be mystified, to become separated from their actual content. This tendency may be stronger among the Jews--whose history and culture contains many mystical elements anyway.

The Jews are one of those few groups whose existence organically involves self-hatred also, for the Jewish individual always has a feeling of danger if he is identified with the group, for "the Jews always view things Jewish with the eyes of the unfriendly majority." In his work titled "Self-Hatred Among the Jews,"⁴--analyzing in detail the frequently contradictory relationship of the group and the individual, the development of attracting and repelling forces--Kurt Lewin finally suggests the conclusion that this self-hatred is probably unavoidable, and--which is now more important--not only does it make assimilation difficult, it means constant anguish.

G. Allport--when he tries, unsuccessfully, to define who is a Jew--may fall into the trap of overpsychologization. He writes that for some people "the Jews fill the function of their superego," since the Jewish religion expects from its followers steadfastly ethical behavior. And he writes that "the concept lying closest to the Jews is the extent of conservative values, that the most striking characteristic of the Jews is their opposition to all conservative mediocrity."⁵

What has been said thus far certainly means that being Jewish is a strongly changing category, and in a double sense. It changes historically, and it changes depending on the viewpoint we take. It means something different in different ages; not only whom the laws consider to be a Jew; but also whether certain strata of the Jews link up with historical progress, whether they come closer to the rising or falling groups of the receiving nation, whether they carry political or ideological values, etc. It means something different if we approach them from within, something different if we approach them from without, if we study their fate or if we study their internal life. What is most important is that Jewishness is a social artifact.

And in Hungary today? The 1970 statistics of THE JEWISH YEAR BOOK, the 1968 data of the BROCKHAUS ENCYCLOPEDIA and a 1980 publication of the United Nations agree in stating that 80,000 Jews live in Hungary. The Israelite Religious Community generally speaks of 100,000 people. This is supported by the indirect data that each year an average of 1,000 Jewish funerals are held in Budapest, about 100 in the provinces. But none of the statistics disclose whom the preparers of them consider to be a Jew. It is certain that they do not mean only those actively following the Israelite faith. But we do not know who they include besides.

But, all this has little to do with how we answer the question, Are there Jews, or is there a Jewry in Hungary today? To do this we must try to analyze the various spheres of social awareness, we must examine whether the existence of Jews or Jewry is reflected, historically or sociologically, in the mass media, in school instruction, in politics and public opinion.

(Historically) After the appearance of the book by Gyorgy Szaraz⁶ it would be stupid to write in detail about the history of Jews in Hungary before

1945, for this work proceeds in an analytical and basic way "on the track of a prejudice," from the time before the occupation of the homeland to the Jewish laws and 1944. Because of the shortage of space there is no discussion in it of the history after 1945, so I only note that this work is part of a larger one which will deal with the history of the Hungarian Jews beginning with 1945.

(Sociologically) The various branches of sociology give an answer, or do not give an answer, to the basic question, of whether Jews live here today, in different ways. The publications dealing with the structure, stratification, social mobility and inequalities of contemporary Hungarian society do not contain the expression "Jew." But the descriptions of the history and developmental trends of society usually talk about the role of the Jews in capitalization and about the social-political role of anti-Semitism.⁷ The cause of this difference is probably simply factual. In Hungary prior to World War II, the Jewish question represented one of the dividing lines within the middle strata and the large capitalists of Jewish origin constituted the chief forces of the large bourgeoisie. So making a distinction between Jew and non-Jew was a "hard" factor in a sociological study of stratification, which social statistics could support and were inclined to support with data regarding both religion and origin.

Today there are no reliable statistical data regarding the number of Jews living here, their schooling and employment ratio, etc. But the fact that no publication takes account of the Jews when characterizing contemporary Hungarian society obviously does not have this lack of data as its chief cause. It is rather that the Jews constitute a group in the structure of our society which can be distinguished with difficulty or hardly at all. Jews can hardly be distinguished from the non-Jewish members of society from the viewpoint of social structure, class and stratum relationships, employment, income or schooling. And the materials dealing with the nationality structure of the population of the country--a different cross section--naturally do not talk about the Jews, because they do not count as a nationality in Hungary.

Another branch of sociology, social psychology, generally does deal in detail with prejudices, and concretely with anti-Semitism, with the internal life and psychic content of the various groups, and thus of the Jews, and with the deep layers of group conflicts. The works of Allport, Lewin and Aronson⁸ have appeared in Hungarian, and they provide important information at least for those interested in social psychology, thus those who get these works.

(In the Mass Media) It is virtually superfluous to emphasize what significance attaches to what sort of picture of the Jews appears in the mass media. The press, book publishing, the arts and school instruction have an eminent role in keeping the question visible or suppressing it, in developing the models and attitudes toward it. But only a multilayered answer can be given to the question of whether the existence of Jews here is reflected in the Hungarian mass media. It is natural that the different editorial offices and creative workshops have different approaches (I am convinced that this is not primarily a function of the ratio of Jews working in them),

but the crucial part of the differences are not of this character, do not differ from shop to shop, but rather develop according to structural factors, according to the size of the sphere "harnessed" by the means of communication involved.

The expression "Jew" is used in two ways or in two senses in our daily papers, radio and television. On the one hand in all of them they regularly write or speak about Israel as the "Jewish state," obviously primarily to avoid stylistically offensive duplication of words. This is entirely proper for Israel is certainly a Jewish state. On the other hand the word "Jew" appears in articles, interviews, and news items about events prior to 1945, or which report on the laying of wreaths, commemorations or conferences on the anniversaries of such events. Otherwise it is not used.

Some of our weeklies, especially ELET ES IRODALOM, sometimes recall the matter of 1944--as a function of waves of fashion in the mass media. And also ELET ES IRODALOM and UJ TUKOR rarely publish information about the life of contemporary religious Jews. The weeklies include UJ ELET, the paper of the National Office of Hungarian Israelites, which is basically the newspaper of the Israelite religion.

The picture is a good bit more varied in regard to our journals (which appear in far smaller numbers than the foregoing). In recent years--after a silence of about 30 years--quite a few publications have appeared about the fate of the Jews in the period between the two wars, about the 1940's and the tragedy of the Hungarian Jews, the role of Hungarian politica and the Hungarian churches in this, etc. So the absolute taboo character of the theme is beginning to disappear, and it is a positive thing in itself that, for example in regard to 1944, we can read not only about "those persecuted," as earlier, but can read concretely about the destruction of 600,000 Jewish Hungarians.

But in addition to the facts and objective analyses in publications of the recent period, there is also another tendency the essence of which is a sort of stubborn attempt to shift responsibility. In part, adapting to attempts to re-evaluate the Horthy period, some try--without success--to prove that what happened here in 1938-1944 was all done by the Germans, that Horthy, the Hungarian churches and other Hungarian political forces fought against it, and even heroically protected the Hungarian Jews. On the other hand, there has been a great increase in the number of those interviews which talk about Hungarians who saved Jews--and it is good that this is so; but today more and more we can read and hear only about these exceptional cases. A person (especially if young, who had not lived through it) reading through the interviews in KRITIKA and VALOSAG⁹ today cannot understand how they were able to deport a single Jew, for everyone was hiding them, disguising them, etc. It is a fact that it is important to talk about those who remained human and helped even in a degraded age. But these positive things can become true values only if they are published with a credible description of their actual environment.

To return to the original question of whether the existence of Jews is reflected in the Hungarian periodicals, it follows from the ratio of what is said and what is not said in the publications which have appeared that one gets the false answer that there were Jews in Hungary before 1945 and since then there have not been. According to my information, there have been only two occasions in our homeland in recent years when anything was published in connection with contemporary Hungarian Jews. The first was a MOZGO VILAG interview with Andras Mezei, concretely about the dilemmas of contemporary Jews. The second was a pioneering issue of VIGILIA dealing with Christian-Jewish dialog (which Chief Rabbi Laszlo Salgo greeted in UJ ELET in the name of all Hungarian Jews, adding that after this perhaps the Hungarian churches would officially carry out their tasks to implement the resolution passed on this subject by Vatican Council II in 1965).¹¹

The most recent period of book publishing indicates a significant revival of literature on this subject, although primarily and almost exclusively talking about pre-1945. After the quite different books of G. Gyorgy Kardos, we find Geza Hegedus, Andras Mezei, Gyorgy Nemes, Sandor Sasdi, Maria Ember, Gyorgy Fazekas, Mihaly Sukosd and others writing honestly and cleverly about the Jews. The works of Sandor Scheiber and the novels of Bernard Malamud have appeared, they published the journals of Bela Balazs and Borbala Szabo, etc.

This theme is very slowly appearing in various branches of the arts also. With the greatest weight in the film arts, for example in "Fortunate Daniel" or most recently in "The Rebellion of Job"; and even if the spectacle of Jews being carted off to the accompaniment of music and surrounded by weeping peasants aroused much antipathy, it is still an important phenomenon that we have had a film about this. Goodly numbers of pieces in our theaters have dealt with the past of the Jews, there have even been productions like Ivan Marko's "Tabus and Fetishes" (which makes use of Jewish folklore to talk about eternal, and thus contemporary, human struggles). The theme has been touched on frequently by graphic arts as well.

We must add to all this that this ambiguous situation of the mass media, the fact that hardly anything is said about this theme publicly, has its advantages for individuals. In this way a person is not so much forced to face the question, to face himself; it permits him to choose a more comfortable solution, he does not clear the matter up in himself, but yields himself to the current of events. And with this he deceives himself.

Jews appear in school instruction also, most ambiguously. For example, Modified History Book No 18 recommended for the eighth grade of general schools on the basis of the Study Plan Modification issued at the directive of the Minister of Culture contains a total of 10 references 1 or 2 words or 1 sentence in length to the Jews or to anti-Semitism when describing the years 1920-1945. The internal distribution of the 10 references is as follows: All 10 pertain to anti-Semitism, the Jewish laws, the concentration camps or the deportation; that is, all of them deal exclusively with the persecution of the Jews. According to another distribution, six refer to foreign and four refer to Hungarian events. So there is not a single

reference in the textbook saying who the Jews are and what made the persecution of them necessary and possible. After this can we wonder that some of the children today do not know what the word "Jew" means? Because this method of communication, in addition to not saying who or what a Jew is, states only that a Jew is a person who is persecuted, locked in a ghetto and killed. Because they deserved it, had done something to merit it? Or simply because they were Jews?

The chapters of the textbooks dealing with the period after 1945 do not contain the word Jew.

(In Politics) Do the Jews exist in politics? Again the answer to this changes historically. After 1945 not only did they exist but did so with great emphasis. In 1946, the National Assembly of Hungary passed Article XXV, 1946, "concerning relief for the stigma and consequences of the persecution affecting Hungarian Jews." In the first paragraph it stated: "The National Assembly of Hungary solemnly establishes that all those actions and measures of the former ruling systems based on foreign influence which deprived a part of the population of the country of their rights because of their Israelite religion or Jewish origin, which outraged their human dignity and led finally to the annihilation of the majority of them--for the most part in foreign camps--were contrary to the eternal ideals of humanity, to the moral views of the Hungarian people and the spirit of Hungarian law. The National Assembly stigmatizes these actions and measures with profound contempt."

Hungarian politics at that time--as was seen from the quoted speech of Erik Molnar--not only permitted but to an extent encouraged debates about the Jewish question. This lasted up to 1948-1949. From that time on this theme disappeared at a blow from the debates, the press and politics.

So do Jews exist in politics today? Definitely not. Party documents and political statements regularly speak of the nationalities in Hungary, of religions and religious people, but not of the Jews. Analyses prepared in the official spheres of ideological life also speak of nationalism, of awareness problems, of anti-Gypsy manifestations, but not about anti-Semitism.

One might get the vague impression that Chief Rabbi Laszlo Salgo, as a National Assembly representative and member of the Capital Council, may be the exclusive representative of religious Jews in these bodies; but this would lead to political impossibilities. In the first place, in the present representative system--basically a regional one--the chief rabbi is primarily the representative of the inhabitants of some electoral district. In the second place--if we wanted to force on him the seemingly impossible task of representing Hungarian Jews--could specifically Hungarian Jewish interests be distinguished, articulated or realized?

Probably not.

(In Public Opinion) Naturally we must also seek an answer to the question of whether Jews exist in public opinion. Obviously only a differentiated

answer can be given to this question, primarily according to whether we are talking about Jews or non-Jews.

In the awareness of Jews it is self-evident that Jews exist today. In a confused way? Without a precise definition? Without precise knowledge of what their Jewishness consists of, its degree and significance? Perhaps only in fear, in dread of anti-Semitism? For the majority this is probably the way it is. Differently, of course, for different generations. People still live among us who were sent to some concentration camp, whose families were eliminated, whose few relatives, if they survived, live in Israel or America. This will never be silenced in their souls. But how they brought up their children, who are now 30-40 years old, what sense of belonging to situations or to a group they gave them, this varies. There are those who have denied their own Jewishness even before their children. There are those who have confessed it only when the child first abused someone for being a Jew, or was so abused. There are those who decided to begin slowly "inoculating" the child that he was Jewish, but immediately dismissed it, explaining that this no longer counted and had no significance, except that, alas, this is why you have no grandparents, my boy, my girl. There are those who did not bring up their children as Jews, but then insist that the child can only marry a Jew. There are those who always denied being Jewish, but before their death asked the child to bury them in the Jewish cemetery, saying only that "I am afraid to lie in a Christian cemetery." There are those who, on the basis of the principle that "no one ever knows what the world will bring," make their children aware of their Jewishness so they would know that this is why they might suffer disadvantages and discrimination.

There are those who brought them up saying: You must assume this fate, and you should be proud of it. There are those who long ago abandoned religion, but on every larger Jewish holiday take the children to temple, not necessarily to pray, but to be there, to know, to undertake and act. There are those who took the son with them every Saturday to synagogue, and guided his finger along the Hebrew lines, from the back forward, from right to left. Surely this list is too short, for there are many shadings still. In any case, it can be said of all of them that not long after 1944 each chose something that could not be attacked. After the fact it can be debated whether this or that decision was practically correct or not--in view of possible advantages today--but he who felt that he had to choose a solution in 1945 or 1955 certainly tried to take account of rational arguments about the present and future, but basically he was guided by emotions and less by his conscious conjectures or nebulous identity.

Must the Jews who are now 20-40 years old face this same dilemma from a different perspective? Yes. (But it follows from preceding, at least, for a majority that Jews and Jewishness do exist in Hungary today.) It is also probable that they are much less able than their parents to define rationally what this consists of. For those who did not experience the persecution, who experienced the 1940's and 1950's at most as children, whose parents put them to bed before they began to talk about politics or

Jewishness, know much less about how and in what they are Jewish. But they know that they are Jews. Those who are half Jewish know too, perhaps involuntarily seeking differences between their parents, and then searching in themselves how the genes (?), the shared upbringing (?), the different intensity of time spent together (?), or who knows what, had different effects, which parent they resemble more--the Jewish one or the Christian one. And frequently these young Jews of today do not understand, because they do not see around them, that the common fate means any real community. Many of them go to temple on the larger holidays although they are not at all religious and do not really understand what is going on there. But it is possible to speak openly and frankly, and after services to sit in an espresso and "chat" until late in the evening about things not possible elsewhere and with others. To belong? In general it is not possible to belong. There is nothing to belong to. Sometimes friendly circles try to recruit from this sphere, but usually they break up after a briefer or longer spasmodic life.

There are those who almost consistently make friends only with the Jews among their erstwhile secondary school or university friends or present colleagues, may try to stick together with them. And there are many who do something different and do it differently; but to give an account of this would be merely an exercise in logic. But one thing must be mentioned: There are those who feel their Jewishness to be a threat to their livelihood, or even as a physical threat.

And it is true of virtually all of them that their Jewish identity, if they have any, is uncertain, lacks meaning, indeed is in general copied. But there is also a field of Jewish awareness which is ideological, quite abstract and filled primarily with positive values. And there is a practical field which manifests itself primarily in a state of constant alert vis-a-vis anti-Semitism.

The awareness of being Hungarian is for these people probably about the same—not only as an accompanying phenomenon or consequence of the awareness of being Jewish, but even as a cause of it. Their awareness of being Hungarian is probably confused, not adequately interpreted and similarly--if in another way--copied. The ideological field in the dichotomy of Hungarian national awareness is more bedecked with flags, there is more color in it, it is more festive; while the practical field is more material, contains more everyday freedom, possibilities, money, goods, housing, etc. But this, obviously, is not a Jewish matter.

Finally we must ask: Does Jewishness exist in the awareness of non-Jews? Lacking empirical studies we are again forced to rely on hypotheses, so a characterization of the several groups of non-Jewish public opinion can again be no more than a calculation of mathematical probabilities. So I formulate a conditional answer: Jews do exist in Hungary today in the great majority of non-Jewish public opinion—including young people—and the picture of them differs in two chief respects from the picture of Jewishness existing in the awareness of the Jews. On the one hand, they think (believe) the Jews to be larger in number, more organized and more cohesive than the Jews

themselves think or believe or, in fact, are. On the other hand, the picture of Jews in the awareness of non-Jews is even more confused and, primarily, lacking information, than that of the Jews. This must be so if the picture of the Jews of the school, mass media, science, politics and the Jews themselves is as it is.

So how can we sum up the answer to the question, Are there Jews in Hungary today? Perhaps in this way: There is no Jewry--as some sort of organized, distinguishable group--but there certainly are Jews. Jewry may exist only in the silence, in the artificial nonexistence. But there are around us Jewish Hungarians, or Hungarian Jews. And that even this fact should be surrounded by silence or even denial is certainly not good. A great many people lower their voice when they say the word "Jew" (not counting a strongly anti-Semitic use of the word or the ignorant). Those who deal professionally with the Jewish question, priests and scientific researchers, pronounce the word "Jew" with the same accent, tone and emphasis as other words. But he who is not used to it changes as he prepares to pronounce the word "Jew." He leans a little closer to his partner in conversation, his voice takes on a sort of anxiety, the tingle of a perhaps forbidden thing, he senses a sort of strange taste in his mouth, his voice drops--and he says it.

Is There Anti-Semitism in Hungary?

We must also talk about anti-Semitism, and not only because the concepts are organically linked. It is also important to talk about this because it **must be seen clearly that anti-Semitism is a social pathological phenomenon** indicating something unsettled, social psychological disturbances. In the **second place because at least since Bibó we have had to know that "the undisturbed nature of assimilation depends primarily on the soundness of the forms of the assimilating community... the internal deadend of the assimilating community is crucial, the causal motif... the fact that in Hungary the assimilation of the Jews took place most strongly precisely in a period when the communal forms were falling apart."**¹²

We can all give examples of contemporary manifestations of anti-Semitism. Of this type and of that type. We tend to dismiss these now, for individual examples have no power of proof. So first let us try to outline with quotations from social psychology what is involved.

According to G. Allport the chief factors in creating and maintaining prejudices are the irrationalities lurking in human nature; within the personality of the prejudiced person they are: "the cultural traditions, the social norms, the education and rearing of children, the models offered by the parents, semantic confusion, a lack of knowledge about intergroup differences, the principles for the development of categories and many other factors."¹³

K. Lewin characterizes anti-Semitism this way: "Historical examples prove that the 'good behavior' of the Jews does not provide a guarantee against anti-Semitism. As a whole, the forces directed against the Jews derive

primarily from conditions existing within the non-Jewish majority, for example, from a situation in which a scapegoat must be sought. To a large extent these forces are independent of the behavior of the Jews. But insofar as the behavior of the Jewish group is relevant, one can accept the argument that over the long run more serious disturbances may derive from higher rather than lower performance."¹⁴

According to Erich Fromm anti-Semitism has always proven to be linked with powers based on authority. According to him, the ultimate root of anti-Semitism lies in the fact that the Jews have proved that the survival of a group is not necessarily based on power. This group without power has survived for 5,000 years, and has still created great cultural and scientific accomplishments. The mere existence of the Jews is a refutation for those who believe in power.

Miklos Szabo derives anti-Semitism from the fundamentally different character of the development of the West and the East. The enemy picture of the Western "state national" developmental type is always an external, alien nation; but the enemy picture for the Eastern "culture national" development is an internal, alien ethnic groups internal political antagonisms appear as deficiencies in national relatedness, which gives an ethnic meaning to political problems; resentment or feelings against rivals appear, frustration connected with mobility gains an ethnic explanation, etc.

Allport provides an exhaustive characterization of the prejudiced personality. He lists the following:

- whatever is involved, he recognized only one correct method;
- he builds basically on the swamp of feelings of insecurity;
- his feelings for his parents are ambivalent, on the surface these are saccharine and polished, but deep down he is protesting bitterly;
- he has rigid moral views and places great emphasis on conventional virtues, on moralizing;
- each phenomenon of the world is accepted or rejected, but the two fields are rigidly separated from one another and no "passage" is permitted between them;
- he strongly demands definiteness; he does not gladly say, "I do not know," he clings to everything which is known, certain, simple and definite--either because his image of himself is burdened with serious confusion and so he seeks definite supports in the external world or because a protest has developed within him against all sorts of delay;
- he sees that he is not the "master of his fate," that things happen independent of him, so he blames others for everything;
- he likes order, especially social order, so he worships institutions, because relying on them he does not have to rely on himself;
- he is strongly nationalistic, or a "patriot";
- he likes authority, and in his need for authority he manifests profound distrust of people.

Allport adds to all this: "By and large the prejudiced way of thinking is a reflection of the way of thinking of the prejudiced individual in general."¹⁵

So how many such prejudiced people are there in a society? Only concrete research could give an answer to this. Allport cites one which was conducted in an American suburb; 10 percent of the people studied here proved to be completely free of any sort of anti-Semitism; 16 percent gave evidence of extreme, almost violent, anti-Semitism; the rest were between the two poles. But this was prior to 1954 and is American research.

Such a survey was made in the FRG in 1982. It turned out that definite anti-Semitic prejudices exist in nearly 20 percent of the West German population and latent anti-Semitism can be more or less demonstrated for another 30 percent.¹⁶

And in Hungary? As far as I know the last concrete research on anti-Semitism in our homeland was in 1917. But sometimes we can get information pertaining to this theme from research directed at other things. For example, the final study of research titled "Development of Socialist Awareness" (for which the base institution was the BTK Philosophy II faculty of the ELTE [Lorand Eotvos Science University]) contains this: "Studies with various approaches did not indicate express discriminatory trends in connection with the Jews. But in the interviews they were frequently characterized as aloof in comparison with positive examples of assimilation." The question was touched on by Peter Jozsa in another study, in the course of a study on a large 2,200-person sample dealing with the value and mentality structure of Hungarian urban youth which involved young people born between 1949 and 1960. Jozsa used the so-called "marriage" test: "Would you object if your daughter married a Gypsy, Jew, Negro, etc.?" The rejection in increasing order developed as follows: nationalities, Jews, Gypsies, those with dark skin but not Negroes and Negroes. In the case of Jews, 73.3 percent of the university graduates, 70.7 percent of the secondary school graduates and 67.1 percent of those with lower schooling gave the "would have no objection" answer.¹⁷

Since research results which can be analyzed are not available, we can give only a conditional answer to the question of whether there is anti-Semitism in Hungary. If we take into consideration what the most important conditions for anti-Semitism are in general and if we can say about these conditions whether they exist here and now, then we can say whether or not there must be anti-Semitism here today. So we cannot say that it does exist, but only that it probably does. So let us make this abstract experiment.

In what follows, taking the lead of G. W. Allport, E. J. Hobsbawm and Istvan Bibo,¹⁸ I will summarize the theoretical conditions for anti-Semitism. It must be emphasized that in addition to these personality and psychodynamic factors which naturally vary from individual to individual there are conditions which might have a concrete effect in the relationships of concrete individuals and groups.

The Theoretical Conditions for Anti-Semitism and the Present Status of These

A society of heterogeneous structure, upward mobility and sudden social changes accompanied by anomie leads or can lead to a strengthening of

anti-Semitism. Within the framework of a diversified civilization there are many differences (distribution of labor and stratum differences, ideologies, religious and philosophical views, tastes, multiplicity of norms, etc.) which can be "perceptual alarm points" and so can give rise to prejudices. According to every responsible document, our society today is quite heterogeneous, indeed there are in it certain "caste-creating" processes which reproduce the lowest and highest strata and to some extent "lock them in," which can strengthen the prejudice against these strata, for example, judgment according to origin. At the same time, we have mobility and in addition to many positive things it is accompanied by the fact that when members of the lower strata feel encouraged to strive upward, this mobility simultaneously stirs up and alarms the other members of society. Mobility can give rise to feelings of endangerment, especially in the middle strata, that is, precisely in that part of society which probably contains the majority of the Jews.

In crisis periods of the life of a society, there is an accelerating breakdown of social values and relaxation of moral norms. In societies which are being reorganized, in periods of economic wavering and great social transformations, all this is coupled with frustration and feelings of insecurity affecting broad strata, and at such times anti-Semitism always strengthens. In a period of the unstable nature of war and peace, the matter of armaments and rocket deployment, the fact that the switch from an extensive economy to an intensive one coincides with internal and external economic problems, the development of the standard of living, the value vacuums and the crises, the identity confusions, etc., the situation of our society is today most complicated and difficult.

So, in sum, these factors, as conditions for anti-Semitism, can be regarded as given in our present society.

Lack of information and limits on communication. If the members of the majority group know little about the group affected, in this case the Jews, then they are defenseless against all sorts of prejudicial influences, in the worst case, even against the blood libels. And if there are obstacles in the path of communication about the actual nature and character of Jewishness then this negative fact mystifies and thus adds to, creates or strengthens anti-Semitic feelings. As Allport writes: "When communication is made difficult by insuperable obstacles, then ignorance makes the person easy prey amidst the claws of rumor, suspicion and stereotypes."

The relative population density of the minority group: a large or increasing density can strengthen the prejudices. (For example, if there is one Japanese child in a school class then he will be the favorite, but if there are more it is probable that they will be segregated and various mechanisms against them will get started.) It is a factor of equal value whether the Jews are distributed evenly within the social structure (this might decrease the anti-Semitism) or are clumped in certain social subgroups. It is very difficult to judge this phenomenon today. If the cited figure of 80,000 is correct it means that 0.75 percent of the population of Hungary is Jewish, thus every 134th person is a Jew. Is this many? Is it sufficient,

relatively, for anti-Semitism? Does it make their presence obvious, or make it disappear? In themselves these are obviously unanswerable questions. Perhaps it can be compared to one thing, the ratio of nationalities in Hungary. According to the 1980 census, 1.2 percent of the total population does not have Hungarian as the mother tongue; 70,000 persons, thus 0.66 percent, claimed not to be of the Hungarian nationality; on the other hand, the council nationalities cultural policy takes into account the nationality language and cultural needs of 263,000 Hungarian citizens (2.46 percent). According to this, the total number of Germans, Croats, Serbs, Slovaks, Romanians, Slovenes, Catholic Serbians, and other nationalities in our homeland is 3.3 times the number of Jews who may live here. This permits us to conclude that the relative population density of Jews is at least sufficient for their separateness to be felt in social consciousness. But in answering the question of whether the Jews are distributed nearly evenly within the various strata and groups of the population, we are reduced exclusively to conjecture. But on the basis of the traditions of Jewish culture, their cultural customs and family traditions and especially on the basis of the history of the Jews, we must presume that this distribution is not even but rather that the great majority of Jews can be found in the middle strata of society. So these conditions are given.

Direct competition and real conflict; making a profit by exploitation. Allport considers the conflict real if the participants pose the competition as an ethnic question, even if it is not. Does such a thing exist here in the case of the Jews? In certain concrete jobs it certainly does, but between social groups it probably does not. By making a profit by exploitation, Allport means that the majority members are contriving to win economic, status, political or sexual advantages at the expense of the minority group by exploiting the spread of prejudices. As a whole the conditions for this are lacking today.

Even if the social regulation of violence is such that there are no officially approved scapegoats against whom disadvantageous discrimination can be used with official approval, the regulation being based on equality, then anger, aggression, etc., can still be directed against ethnic groups in the "subregulatory" sphere. This possibility exists in regard to the Jews. Cultural processes promoting loyalty or education urging positive attitudes toward the majority group, one's own nation, can lead to ethnocentrism—in addition to many important positive effects of it—and a side-effect of this can be the easier development or survival of prejudice against minority groups. We must take into account this phenomenon in regard to the Jews.

In general, unfavorable attitudes toward assimilation or cultural diversity strengthen all sorts of prejudice. So if there is a negative attitude toward mixed marriages, promotion of Jews, their assimilation or maintaining their separateness then these things increase anti-Semitism. To what degree is debatable, but it is a fact that this is present today, too. So, in sum, these conditions are given.

There is a close link between nationalism and discrimination against minority groups. The stronger nationalism, in the bad sense, is in certain groups, that is, excessive "patriotism," the more strongly anti-Semitism will work in them. The present evaluation of this phenomenon has been given by a temporary resolution of the party: "Nationalist views have reappeared and increased in some strata of our society in recent times." So the condition exists.

Immediately after the war, the effect of Hitlerism and Auschwitz was that if anti-Semitism had existed in some then, they were ashamed of it, and it became impossible to express it openly among the generations who had lived through World War II. This significantly reduced anti-Semitism at the time. But all this is mere history for people under 45 years of age (60-70 percent of the population in Europe and America). So the repressive effect of the atrocities is no longer felt.

For a time, the creation and existence of the state of Israel also moderated anti-Semitism, for it proved that the Jews were standing their ground in areas which earlier had been regarded as exclusively "Christian" occupations, such as soldiering and farming. In a paradoxical and brutal manner, it improved the judgment of Jews living in the diaspora that within a few years the army of Israel reaped sweeping victories in several wars. In the last decade the prestige of Israel has decreased greatly, the war has become permanent and indignation that the Jews are treating the Palestinians in such a way as to make them virtually the "Jews of the Jews" has become stronger than the earlier "keeping one's fingers crossed for the victor." Naturally the official Hungarian foreign policy position has at least divided the sentiments.

Hobsbawm notes with scientific objectivity that it decreases anti-Semitism that in many places other minorities have become the chief center of racial persecution, thus offering protection to the Jews. Today those seeking an object for prejudice have turned against the Blacks, the Indians, the Pakistanis, etc., and thus the Jews have "escaped" from the line of fire. If we think of the general judgment of Gypsies in Hungary then we must say with throat-tightening ambivalence: True, this factor is present here too, And so this must be mentioned as one of the conditions for discouraging anti-Semitism.

The human and empirical relationships of the Jews and the environment developed as a result of prejudices, but the dehumanization which survives the prejudices, as a result of which the Jews and the members of the environment repeatedly acquire misleading but no less real bad experiences about one another, is also a condition given today.

Let me add to what has been cited yet another condition which I formulated myself, which Allport, Hobsbawm and Bibo could not have described, since it is a specifically Hungarian feature which could be formulated only after 1956. This is the effect of the 1950's. We are talking about the fact that a large proportion of the members of the top political leadership of the so-called Rakosi period were Jews.

If when filling a post the Jewish members of the supreme leadership--compensating also for their own Jewishness--could choose between two people of approximately equal ability, one a Jew and one not, obviously they had to choose the non-Jew, because otherwise they would have fallen under the charge of Zionism, or of letting the leadership levels below the top ones, thus power as a whole, "falls into the hands of the Jews."

To top this off, this overwhelmingly Jewish leadership carried out the public preparation for the Zionist trials, the Jewish doctor trials, and open Jew baiting in, for example, the Rajk trial--even if directly on the Stalinist model. Indeed, they presented an opportunity to use anti-Semitism for petty political conspiracies, the use of a formula "written in the big book" for "getting rid of political tension with anti-Semitism."

Because of this basic situation the picture of the communist and the picture of the Jew were again linked in the awareness of many--and again with many dimensions.

Obviously this composition of the leadership not only strengthened anti-Semitism in many people but at the same time created a "reflexive" anti-Semitism, the hypothesis that the Jews who survived and returned home after the war would now expropriate all economic and political status because of and as compensation for the holocaust.

This period was also accompanied by the fact that the politics raised the theme of Jewishness and assimilation to the level of a "supertaboo" and eliminated them from the vocabulary of the mass media, political usage and even scientific life--with an effect which, as we saw in the preceding chapter, still exists to a certain degree today.

There was and is another consequence of great significance going beyond this tabu, namely that the Hungarians have never been able to truly "process" their responsibility to the Jews for what happened before 1945. There was no way--Bibo warned of the absolute necessity of this late (in 1948) and in vain--for the Hungarians to face what had happened and announce: Hereafter it will not be so. Instead, the entire question was artificially silenced, which did not solve it but only made it invisible, and thus increased the problem.

It was a natural consequence of all this that anti-Semitism appeared again during the 1956 counterrevolution. True, not on a mass scale, but there were anti-Semitic slogans and there were atrocities against Jews.

The 1956 counter-revolution, and the consolidation which followed it, which can be regarded as a political change in this respect also, put an end to this trap situation. But the traces and consequences of it are still present in social awareness, among the present conditions for anti-Semitism.

In sum, it can be established that the answer to the question of whether anti-Semitism could theoretically exist in Hungary today is largely an affirmative one, and only in a smaller part negative.

Can this represent any certainty from the viewpoint of an actual reality? Probably not. On the basis of this we cannot say that there is anti-Semitism in our homeland today, we especially cannot hazard conjectures about its character or magnitude, or what type of atrocities it might lead to in a significant social-political conflict situation. But going beyond a mathematical summation, we must say that the great majority of the conditions for anti-Semitism are given today, and on this basis it is probable that an anti-Semitism is present--in various degrees and with different orientations--in various strata of society. In the absence of empirical research it cannot be said whether anti-Semitism is stronger or weaker today than, for example, 10 years ago. All those with whom I had an opportunity to talk said it was stronger. But we can be less certain that hostility to the Jew actually increased in recent years or decades or if only it now appears more openly while earlier it tended to lie dormant. Lacking studies we cannot say to what extent the currently existing anti-Semitism is conscious in individual heads or social groups. We can only hypothesize that it may have eroded or "dissolved" to a certain extent since 1956, forced back among the living prejudices.

Of course all this might be made manifest in the trends of a few empirical facts, too. At the time of the largest Jewish holidays there is significant and unconcealed police preparation around the synagogue on Dohany St--obviously interdependent with terrorist acts against the Jews in the West in recent times--certainly indicating that the internal affairs organs consider an open anti-Semitic move possible. The profound silence of the mass media covers certain fears or presumed counterinterests. Despite all the artificial repression of it, hostility against the Jews comes up again and again in certain more strongly affected universities, research institutes or even editorial offices.

But all these hypotheses would be one-sided if we did not try to think through--again in the absence of empirical research--what sorts of anti-Semitism there are today, what sort of charges are involved. Discrimination against the Jews exists on three levels. There is an almost "spontaneous" anti-Semitism. It does not even recognize the Jews, it is simply deeply embedded in Hungarian political culture, historically since the 19th century. (The most intellectual form of this is the constant exchange of jokes which begin, "Kohn and Gruen were talking".) There is a separate "intellectual" anti-Semitism. In most cases, this starts by emphasizing that the speaker is not an anti-Semite, indeed in general he is not prejudiced, he emphasizes that he has a number of Jewish friends and knows a number of Jews who are all right, but.... And in principle one can distinguish a third level too, political anti-Semitism, which does not necessarily mean an anti-Semitic party of the Istoczy type or a direct fascist policy, but it is a fact that today it can be mentioned exclusively in past times.

What are the typical "charges" today, what are the usual "supporting," explanatory arguments for contemporary anti-Semitism? We often hear: "They are simply different." They are different in appearance, too--dark, hooked noses. Many are odd, they behave differently in everything; one is too easily enthusiastic, another is too cynical, in a word they go to

extremes. There is also something "unnatural" in the fact that most of them live exemplary family lives, their families stick together too much. They don't drink, don't know how to have fun.

Frequently it is said: "They have a different style." If they have money, they are showoffs or "upstarts"; if they are fashionable, they are fashion plates or "dandies"; if they are clever they are conceited; if they are scientists they are pedants; if they are leaders they are overbearing; if they are in private trade they are tricksters; if they are lovers they are ardent; and so forth.

Can anything be said to these things? Are these sweeping generalizations true? Can we say categorically that they are not true? Are they prejudices simply on the basis that they are overgeneralizations? It is certain that any extreme can be found among non-Jews too; but it is also true that to a certain extent these styles of behavior can be derived from the historical Jewish culture in the broad sense. Elements of it, traces of it certainly exist--but not as a general characteristic.

One of the chief "charges" against the Jews is that they are rich or at least well off, because they extort, grab, make money out of everything; and such an argument has strong emotional support, for it feeds primarily on envy of individuals. Whether it is true obviously depends primarily on what work the Jews do, how profitable their opportunities are on the job, in their assignment, in their "getting on board" the second economy. These impressions have historical causes. It is a fact that the history of the Jews developed in such a way that for millenia they were barred from every career with the exception of trade in money and goods, thus not only was the trade of moneychanger or merchant passed on from generation to generation but--as a psychological defense--the love of this work was too. And it is true that in preliberation Hungary the rich Jews made up a large proportion of banking life, the bourgeoisie and commerce. They were affected by nationalization and resettlement like the others, and in greater proportion than others they chose to go abroad; few were left to tell the tale of this stratum. So the starting chances of today's Jews cannot be substantially better than those of others; at most they may be in the area of passing on cultural traditions.

As proof of well being they also say that all the Jews live in Budapest, because it is easier and better there. There are historical reasons for this too. In the course of the deportations and mass murders of 1941-1945 the losses among provincial Jews were about 80 percent, while among Budapest Jews they were "only" 52 percent. So virtually no Jews remained in the provinces.

One can also hear as an argument that the Jews are all intellectuals, and can be found primarily in the upper strata of the intelligentsia, so they deprive others of leading positions. The possible answer to this is again primarily historical. Prior to the liberation the Hungarian Jews were strongly stratified. At the top were the bankers, capitalists and large merchants; finally--and it was a fairly large proportion--there were

shopkeepers, tailors, etc. and workers and sometimes even peasants. Jewish workers represented a special political force in Hungarian political life, sometimes in the labor movement too--naturally not with such weight as, for example, in Russia, where the "Bund" was a separate Jewish labor organization around 1910. Development after 1945 "eliminated" the top strata of Jews from their earlier position, it left the middle strata largely untouched, while the lower strata probably rose--as part of the acceleration of general social mobility. It is probable that the former Jewish workers and especially the overwhelming majority of their children took advantage of the opportunity when the banning of Jews from the universities and intellectual careers finally ended. The mobility gates which opened for society as a whole may have been more attractive for those who had been forced exclusively into certain occupations by the earlier racial limitations. So it may be true that the great majority of Jews living here today are working in intellectual careers (in scientific life, at all levels of education, art, commerce and the press, as physicians and lawyers, in the apparatus of social and state organs) and especially the women in other "intellectual" jobs involving on-the-job training, and in the artisan and retail trade area.

Can this mean--as is sometimes said--that the intelligentsia and middle strata have been "Jewishized"? Let us turn to the figures. If we hypothesize that all the Hungarian Jews today can be found in these strata and if we compare this to the most recent stratification data of the "Status and Stratum" research of the Social Sciences Institute, then we get the following picture. The elite, the urban upper stratum and the middle strata make up a total of 28.2 percent of the population, with roughly 3 million people. If we compare exclusively to this the 2.66 percent ratio of the 80,000 Jews it means that every 38th person in the upper or middle stratum is Jewish.

It is often said against the Jews that they stick together, protect and help one another, not only in trouble but otherwise too, in the area of protection, mutually offering illegal advantages, etc. The typical form of this "charge" may be the one in which a "shifting" of social problems can be well demonstrated, disguised in an ethnic mask. It is certainly a troublesome difficulty of our public life that protection or unprincipled personal contacts do exist; some try to go from this to the involvement of the Jews. But simple logic is the other way around; if these problems are present in society then obviously they exist among the Jews too. And a mystification of this on racial grounds only plays down the essence.

In conclusion, I would mention one more concrete phenomenon regarding the present existence of anti-Semitism. Teachers frequently report about it. Children in the general schools speak abusively not only of the Gypsies but also of the Jews. I would like to emphasize two elements of this phenomenon. In the first place, that the parents of these children are today 25-45 years old, and so were born after the war. So those from whom the children learned this pejorative term at home had no interest in the holocaust either pro or con, but at most through their parents. But if the children use this word in the pejorative sense deliberately, they must have

heard it frequently at home, and with a strong negative emotional charge. In the second place, I would like to oppose the opinion that makes light of this matter. Some teachers and parents shrug it off when the children use "Jew" pejoratively, saying: "They are only using it as a synonym for 'idiot.'" This may be true, but the consequences of it are not without danger. Let me again quote G. Allport: "Children learn an aversion to a word before they know what it attaches to. We could cite a number of examples of cases where the words have a strong and emotional ring in the ears of the children without their knowing to whom the words pertain. Following this, the emotion evoked by the words is projected onto the groups too.... Then the emotional effect flows without obstacle onto the object designated."¹⁹

Do the Jews Have a "Situation" in Hungary Today?

Every social being is simultaneously a member of several groups. He belongs more strongly to one, more weakly to another, and this dependence is in constant change. He slowly distances himself from one group and approaches others quickly, though perhaps with different speeds. It may be that someone is surrounded by several types of vacuum at the same time; or perhaps he has a struggle deciding which common fate to deliberately assume and what he should try to eliminate from his heart and his life. In addition, belonging to these groups is not black and white, a balanced emotional group life free of conflicts is very rare (if it exists at all); there are many shadows, much ambivalence, communal crisis, slipping aside. The Jews live in this constant change too. But with identities more confused than the average and sometimes feeling anti-Semitism.

So what is the situation of Jews living in Hungary today? Basically the following: Jewry, as a framework for belonging somewhere which can be experienced in everyday practice, has largely disintegrated; a state of organization or internal cohesive force among Jews, transcending occupational groups, strata or social positions, has largely ended; at most what exists is--presuming that they exist--more strongly in the awareness of non-Jews and less so in the awareness of Jews. But Jewish individuals do live among us, and they know this about themselves, so to some extent they must face the question of what to take on from their Jewish origin, to what degree they should do so, and what they should not take on from it.

According to everyday usage, two types of Jews live here today--Jewish Hungarians and Hungarian Jews. According to the stylistic rules for qualifying and qualified words (the second, or qualified, word is emphasized) this represents two poles--those who consider their Hungarianness to be primary, but also feel themselves to be Jews, and those who feel themselves to be primarily Jews, and only after that Hungarian. But there are a great many transitional variants between these two poles, indeed there may be self-interpretations outside these two poles, for example, those who not only deny their Jewishness but try to free themselves of it by every means, or those who would gladly leave this country and go to Israel or elsewhere, where they could be cosmopolite Jews.

But with this, Jews as individuals have gotten into a situation which is entirely new compared to earlier ones, a situation in many ways better but also in many ways more difficult. A reduction in the tension vis-a-vis--as K. Lewin describes in detail--does not decrease but rather increases the tension in the lives of the Jews. With the disintegration of the Jewish group, the Jewish family or individual becomes separate, is left much more on his own, so now the pressure which had fallen on the Jewish group (primarily in the ghetto period) affects the Jewish individual personally. The elimination of the ghetto means that there is no longer a medium in which he did not necessarily have to face the pressure coming from without. Lewin characterizes this by saying that the individual has "almost reached" the goal, belonging to the majority group, but the psychic burdens of this will not be easier but rather much more difficult, and it can easily happen that the trap will close. "The prisoner who has almost completed his 3-year sentence escapes a few days before his release, because he cannot bear to belong neither here nor there."²⁰

The Jewish Hungarianizing Club no longer exists (which, of course, was a Jewish organization in its time), and there is hardly any communication with or without therapy which would at least permit the sharing of this burden, so one might know: Even if I must travel this path alone, I know that others are on it too, and they too are dragging themselves along with difficulty.

But Lewin wrote the above in 1940. Erik Molnar said about the same thing in 1946, Istvan Bibó in 1948--and Andras Mezei in 1983. With a difference of 40 years, everyone talks about the last moment before assimilation, and during that time two new generations have entered it. So it may be that the "timetable" for assimilation is not precise. Perhaps this situation, this moment before the last results in its being stabilized. This may be good for some people of Jewish origin; they are strongly assimilated, but not completely; there can still be some Jewish identity without thus bringing on oneself the complete isolation of the environment--this may provide the good feeling and anguish of the freedom of an individual decision.

This is one of the most debated dilemmas of the entire Jewish question; it is true, not publicly debated. There are those who absolutely deny that there is assimilation, citing in part the role of inheritance and in part the fact that if the Jews have not been assimilated in several thousand years then it cannot happen today. According to others, it necessarily follows from the fact that Jewry as an organized group maintaining internal relationships is already essentially assimilated into the Hungarian nation then the Jews as individuals will assimilate, too. The debates are made difficult by the fact--since we are talking about thought processes strongly colored by emotion--that virtually everyone considers his own, individual opinion to be the only generally valid alternative, indeed the way pointing to the future. Because the evaluation of the present situation in this question is also a prediction of the future considered correct. He whose opinion it is that there is no assimilation says this because, according to him, assimilation is not a good path. He who says that there is

assimilation approves of it and even desires it, even in its "hard" form, as Andras Mezei writes:

"Let your people be destroyed:
Have mercy on them, my God.
Let the basket descend,
Leave the tablet blank....
Let your people die under the existence of other peoples,
Let their blood flow out,
Blood more inextensible than all...."

Just this is the chief question of the situation of Jews living in Hungary today: Is it good or not good that there should be or should not be assimilation, is it the chief or exclusive path, or not? But one cannot, and primarily one should not, answer this question in generalities. To pronounce a generally valid thesis about assimilation would mean constraining and denying all those who might want to behave a bit differently in their own, private affairs. Only tolerance can be a good solution--over the short and long run alike. Respecting human freedom does not permit either forcing assimilation or forcing the survival of Jewish self-awareness. On the contrary, it demands that the social environment let everyone follow to the end the path he has chosen.

He who wants to can be an unchanged Jew, and should suffer no disadvantage for it. But he can do this without anti-Semitism.

Allport describes how the suffering produced by the frustration caused by discrimination and humiliation leads to sensitivity and increased interest which, if the individual is basically of the outgoing type, results in obsessive interest and suspicion, guile and cheating; strengthening the bonds tying him to his own group; aggression and rebellion, competition and unruliness and an increased desire to achieve.

And he who wants to should be permitted to assimilate, and should suffer no disadvantage for it. But he also can do this without anti-Semitism, because assimilation under the pressure of anti-Semitism is a lie and, as in the former case, the suffering produced by the frustration caused by discrimination and humiliation leads to sensitivity which, if the individual is basically the introverted type, results in denial of his own group; withdrawal and passivity; "playing along"; self-hatred; aggression directed against one's own group; sympathy with every sacrifice; a desire for symbolic achievement and anxiety.

Taking cognizance of this, only that position can remain victorious which recognizes the justice of individual paths, thus it puts the emphasis not on this or that behavior by the Jews but rather on forcing back anti-Semitism. Naturally this involves the prolonging of the last moment before assimilation, not only theoretically but in practice, and it may last a long time.

The things unsaid, treating it as a taboo and the tendentious sideslipping maintain the unresolved situation, and this may induce a mutual survival of

the prejudices, even strengthening them further and hardening them. So we must think through whether we can do something against it.

But any attempt at formulation has a prior ethical motif, thinking through who can say what to whom. According to many, a Jew must say: "I am a Jew, therefore, I cannot instruct the Jews about anti-Semitism, because this is their business; if still I do talk about it it is important not to my Jewishness but to my Hungarianness."

Bibo describes in detail what, according to him, can be said about everything by a non-Jew to a non-Jew to a Jew, by a Jew to a non-Jew and by a Jew to another Jew. I will not repeat this but only summarize: Everyone something different. Naturally, this is true, but--I think--this is not the main question. It is not true that the most important "front line" in the Jewish question is between Jews and non-Jews. There is a "front line" between anti-Semites and non-anti-Semites, indeed between philo-Semites and non-philo-Semites, and this is a more essential dividing line than the distinction between Jews and non-Jews. But the most important "front line" is between the true believers in and the enemies of democracy and freedom. When searching for the tasks coming up in the course of eliminating group prejudices the first thing is always to find the bridge. I do not believe that one must search primarily for a bridge between Jews and non-Jews. First of all one must find a bridge between those who believe in democracy in general--in the words of Bibo, "Going beyond the Jewish question, a social order based on the qualitative equality of man and man"--and its enemies, of course they almost never voice their views openly but only act in a disguised way. Secondly, perhaps, one might build up a practice of communication and trust between non-anti-Semitic non-Jews and non-philo-Semitic Jews. And only in third place, after and on the basis of the former, can one try--again quoting Bibo--"to rehumanize, to make human and real, the paths of human communication in relationships strictly between Jews and non-Jews, the gestures and tone of communication, contact, question, answer, reproach, explanation, calling to account and assumption of responsibility."

And must the Jews of today do something in the interest of all this? Certainly. Before all else there is need for facing the facts, for sovereign decisions, and carrying them out consistently. In an indirect sense, only he should wear a Star David around his neck who does not take it off at the beach where everyone can see it; and he should not wear a Star of David who wants to show off with it, or he who hates to see a cross around the neck of another.

Every Jew must decide for himself what he wants, what he will do with his Jewishness, and especially what he will say about this to his children. And he must do this honestly, until he changes his opinion. He who wants to assimilate can choose this path, to try to become completely "free" of his Jewishness; as many did earlier, presuming that becoming a Communist was the truest equality; or as those who "denied" their origin, but more especially they should not use it, not calculate with it. But these paths

can be taken honestly only if he who so decides does not ask when judging others whether they are Jews; does not try to be proud of what is still "Jewish" in him; is not friends only with Jews; and so forth.

He who so decides may seek what is for him a rational harmony between the possible varieties today of Hungarian Jew and Jewish Hungarian; retaining from Jewish identity, culture and customs what he judges to be valuable and important for him; incorporating this into a Hungarian culture which is his mother tongue, system of everyday communication and field of social action. But then he must decide also what it is that he is undertaking, in what way and to what degree; and he must assume all the consequences of this decision too. Not by "turning the other cheek," but rather by feeling the responsibility that with this behavior he is classifying others as well; that he is providing a model, a basis for generalization, for Jews and non-Jews alike.

And he who wants to live his Jewishness--with or without religion--so totally that he will have primarily a Jewish identity should belong to Jewry, but with the knowledge that he is doing this in Hungary, and with proper appreciation that he can. I do not mean that he should say thank you because he is permitted to realize a fundamental human right. But I do mean that he should respect the fact that this country has gone through a lot and is striving with all its strength for the possible further development.

If anti-Semitism is to continue to decrease we must put an end to the "taboo character" of this theme in the mass media. In this way, the Jewish question can become a subject for conversation in an everyday tone of voice. Naturally, it is important for this that not only should this theme figure in the mass media but that there should be balance between past and present, between the persecution and saving of the Jews. However harsh it may sound, the matter of Auschwitz must be kept alive in public opinion, this cataclysm of mankind must not be forgotten, and a spirit of assuming responsibility for the persecution of the Jews must be built into our history, history should not be falsified. It must be understood also that the presence of the Jews and, for example, their congregation in certain occupational groups is a result of history, and accordingly it should be understood that there are also basically objective, and not personal, causes for intergroup conflicts. As part of the spreading psychological culture, it is important to see to it that we do not regard prejudices as products of instincts but rather as products of human awareness, so they are not given in advance and are not unchangeable, rather we should treat them as psychological phenomena which can be influenced and reduced by education and especially by proper treatment. It is a fact that the attempt to communicate often produces a communication short circuit. We frequently hear such stereotypes as: "You are right, old fellow, I cannot answer," "Leave me alone, I can't do anything about what my fathers did," "You should understand that having a guilty conscience over the fascist period only leads to intellectual impotence." But perhaps even these will help in the development of humanized contacts and spirit.

Independent of the Jewish question there is a frequently arising need today to educate people to not only tolerate diversity but to see possible positive values in it. It is an important factor against anti-Semitism that "the entire question of communal affiliation be purged of every general schema, force or demand, a simultaneous serious recognition of the reality and possibility of assimilation and a separate Jewish self-awareness, creating pure conditions and an atmosphere of goodwill for both" (Bibo). As part of this there is a need to keep nationalism in check for proper vigilance and a cultured, wise reaction against new manifestations of anti-Semitism.

With the reform of the economy and the political system, the way of life and human contacts therein also cry out for reform. Two spheres of tasks appear at once. On the one hand, the development of freer and more human group lives, small communities, helping and permitting the development of these, freedom for spontaneous organization and movements--including those connected with the Jews; expanding the alternative possibilities for simply belonging somewhere. On the other hand, we must educate people to this from childhood. So we should make the children (at home, in the school, in the mass media and in political practice alike) into tolerant personalities; educating them to culture, empathy, correct self-awareness, tolerance of ambiguous situations and to be able to have the internal feeling of security and ego strength to have convictions, and as people with convictions to be able to weigh independently every case demanding a concrete decision in the light of a more general truth and to realize in their decisions the dialectic of the general and the individual.

We must finally speak openly of the Jews and Jewry. This is in the interest not of the Jews but rather of a Hungarian nation which includes Jews. For, as Erik Molnar said in his time: "Anti-Semitism today is directed against democracy. The struggle against anti-Semitism coincides with the struggle for democracy. The victory of democracy in Hungary will finally solve the Jewish question."

FOOTNOTES

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7. "Development of Our Social Structure,": Social Sciences Institute of the MSZMP, Budapest, 1981, pp 19-41 and 69; T. Ivan Berend and Gyorgy Ranki: "One Hundred Years of the Hungarian Economy," Kossuth Book Publishers, Budapest, 1972; Kalman Kulcsar: "Contemporary Hungarian Society," Kossuth Book Publishers, Budapest, 1980; Peter Hanak: "Bourgeoisization and Assimilation in Hungary in the Nineteenth Century," TORTENELMI SZEMLE, 1974, No 4, and the same: "The Unfinished Trial," JELENKOR, 1983, No 5.
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12. Istvan Bibo: "Distorted Hungarian Constitution, Deadend Hungarian History," VALASZ, 1948.
13. Allport, op. cit., p 536.
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16. VALOSAG, 1982, No 6.
17. "Social Science Research," Kossuth Book Publishers, Budapest, 1982 and Peter Jozsa: "Sociodemographic Composition, Value and Mentality Structure of Hungarian Urban Youth," rough study, Vol II, People's Culture Institute, Budapest, 1979.
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21. Agnes Heller: "Social Role and Prejudice," Academy Book Publishers, Budapest, 1971.

IMPROVED FORECASTING OF CRISIS DEPENDS ON PROPER ANALYSIS

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 42, 20 Oct 84 p 14

[Article by Jerzy J. Wiatr: "Cassandra's Seismographs"]

[Text] In the conclusions formulated by the PZPR Central Committee commission set up to investigate the causes and the course of social conflicts throughout the history of People's Poland, one can read, inter alia, the following statement:

"The party's scholarly centers should work out a system of early discovery of symptoms of developing contradictions and conflicts, to enable the party and the state to defuse them in time, and to prevent their turning into crisis situations."

More than a year has already passed since the 12th Plenum of the Central Committee accepted the commission's report, but there are no indications that the question of the just-mentioned system of early discovery of crisis symptoms has lost any of its validity.

In light of the past experience of the social sciences, it might, perhaps, make sense to ponder what conditions such a system would have to meet, and how it might be possible to begin its creation. It would also be worthwhile to realize--with no illusions or embellishment--how complex the issue is, and what kind of obstacles such an enterprise would have to overcome.

The very fact that the problem has been posed in such an authoritative political document as the report of the Central Committee commission is a remarkable innovation. Until now, after all, a seemingly "optimistic" view prevailed, according to which an acute breakdown of the economic and sociopolitical life of the country consisted of various unfortunate events, whose roots derived exclusively from mistakes committed by former political leadership teams, and which "would never happen again." Shutting out the very idea that crises we had to deal with previously might repeat themselves was the reason why warning signals which forecast the imminent approach of ominous clouds found it so difficult to assert themselves. They rarely went beyond typewritten papers, carefully read by a fairly narrow circle of people who were trying to keep their eyes open, but reaching the broader public only to

a minimal degree. A case in point might be, for instance, the book by M.F. Rakowski, "The Republic on the Threshold of the 1980's," available in typescript by 1979 but not published until the summer of 1981; by then the author was deputy prime minister, and the "threshold of the 1980's" turned out to be the beginning of a most profound crisis.

In his introduction to that book, Prof Jan Szczepanski pointed out that "this treatise had shared the fate of other analyses, prognoses, warnings, and good advice, since no organized force had stood behind it to force the group then in power to take it seriously." Thus contemporary forecasters found themselves in a situation remindful of the Trojan Cassandra, whose gift of prophecy had allowed her to notice the ominous future, but the gods had punished her and her predictions were treated with mistrust by her countrymen.

An optimist might reply that by now--after our recent experience--the "organized force," whose absence Professor Szczepanski considered the original cause of failed warning prognoses in the pre-August [1980] period, actually has come into existence. The party itself now wishes to become such a force, since in its official platform it has inserted the target I mentioned at the beginning of these remarks. A realist, however, would add that an obstinate effort is still needed to prevent goodwill alone, once again, from being the end of the matter.

In world scholarship the search for the so-called "early warning signs" was first instituted by scholars interested in problems of war and peace, who focused on the prevention of ominous crises in international relations. The idea that crises in international relations, including their most perilous expression, wars, might be foreseen in a scientific manner, as atmospheric phenomena are forecast, originated with a British meteorologist, Lewis F. Richardson (1881-1953), who in the years preceding the outbreak of World War II pioneered forecasting initiatives, which were ignored at the time. Richardson collected statistical data concerning armaments, interstate conflicts, international trade, international contacts, and other events, and worked out a mathematical theory of forecasting imminent crises. He tried to publish it even before the war, convinced that propagation of knowledge about the imminent danger might contribute to its prevention. Here again, a prognosis was doomed to share Cassandra's fate, and Richardson's principal oeuvre was not published until 1960, after his death.

Richardson's effort was not in vain, however. Although contemporary theoreticians of international relations are generally critical of the indicators chosen by Richardson, and although his conviction that by pinpointing a statistical correlation between armaments and the probability of the outbreak of war he had provided a scientific explanation of the genesis of war, is now widely criticized, the very idea of the mathematical forecasting of social and political phenomena has sunk roots in scholarship. Many postwar scholars have followed in Richardson's footsteps, improving the instruments of mathematical forecasting in international relations. A major contribution

has been made by many institutes and centers for the study of peace, established in various countries over the last two decades; they have tried to elaborate precise scientific methods of forecasting dangers, and thus to work for its reduction.

Somewhat similar has been the story of model prognostication of dangers to civilization, linked to the consecutive reports submitted by the Club of Rome. The first efforts devoted to this issue included a mathematically documented pessimistic prognosis concerning the fate of the human race. The pessimism was much more pronounced in the first "Rome Report" than in the following one, which by then mentioned an "only realistic solution," based on a worldwide approach to the existing threats by initiating some preventive measures suggested in this report. A group of Latin American scholars from the Bariloche center in Argentina went one step farther, presenting an original forecasting model meant to demonstrate what the fate of humankind might be unless a radical worldwide policy of redistribution of assets were undertaken in time.

The forecasting experience on a global scale, only partly familiar in our country and insufficiently appreciated in our own scientific pursuits, might provide a proper starting point for some reflection on the methodology of research focused on early discovery of symptoms and sources of social tension and crisis phenomena. Even though I do realize that the problems are not similar, and that many methodological experiments I just mentioned need radical reevaluation, I am convinced nevertheless that contemporary science has by now acquired ample experience which might prove useful for us as well.

The most significant of these experiments might be summarized as follows: We are now able to project the forecasting of threats from the realm of guesswork and intuition into the domain of exact science. This does not mean that traditional prognoses, based on intuition and experience, or on a *sui generis* "musical ear" which indicates something not yet seen by the unaided eye, though already discernible to a particularly sensitive observer, have lost all their importance. In politics they will always be bound to play a major role. The crux of the matter, however, is that they are not sufficient by themselves, and in addition they concern political instinct rather than belonging to the realm of science. Science, however, should pick up signals warning against a crisis situation in a precise and objective manner, so that its conclusions could provide *sui generis* seismographs of imminent tensions; they should alert us early enough, when rationally guided action might still prevent crisis situations. It would seem opportune to look from that vantage point at some research trends and their practical usefulness. Finally, it might be worthwhile to discuss the relative value of various methods previously used in the social sciences from the point of view of the targets thus set up.

Let us analyze first the possibility of using the most popular and most widespread methods of investigating the state of society, namely the sociological opinion polls. In Poland they have accumulated by now experience which goes back nearly a quarter of a century, since the Center for Public Opinion Research and Programmatic Studies has functioned at Polish Radio and TV since 1958; centers affiliated with universities and with the Polish Academy of Sciences have also polled public opinion for roughly the same period of

time. A government-sponsored Center for Public Opinion Research has also been established recently. We have therefore a wealth of materials which reflect the state of public opinion.

It has often been pointed out, in a rather accusatory way, that the results of such studies have not always been generally accessible. I support the call for as broad an availability as possible of results of public opinion research, but from the point of view of the problem here discussed this is a minor issue, compared to restrictions inherent in the very instruments of opinion research as a forecasting instrument.

Let us start with a simple case. At the end of the 1970's many opinion polls were carried out in Poland, including those taken by academic centers of sociology, never suspected by anyone of a conscious tendency to embellish the results according to the taste of those who at that time ruled the country. But the results of those polls have proven drastically inadequate to what--in the summer of 1980 and in the following year--was to emerge as the sociopolitical reality. Sociological research devoted to the younger generation indicated, for instance, that young people used to treasure most the apolitical values of private life; they did not alert us to the possibility that it was the younger generation that was going to turn into the most active element during the stormy events of 1980-81. Sociological soundings of opinion failed as indicators which should have signaled the growing crisis symptoms in the society.

One might draw some critical conclusions here concerning the weight of opinion polls as such. I would not, however, take that path. The experience of scholarly public opinion polls, both in Poland and in other countries, indicates that they are indeed a fairly good and reliable way to find out the state of opinions shared by the population. But this manner of discovering reality is limited, insofar as it tells rather little about potential changes in the state of opinions in the future, even in the near future.

I might be worthwhile to ponder the reasons for this limitation. It is affected by a certain feature of mass opinion, described over 60 years ago by Walter Lippmann. According to him, public opinion is shaped by emotional stimuli to a degree incomparably stronger than are the opinions of individuals, those better prepared and therefore more critical. It could happen that one strong stimulus might bring about such a strong turnabout in public opinion that whatever had been valid a day earlier would become a thing of the past, totally out of date just 1 day later.

In 1980 we experienced this ourselves in Poland. After all, had one tried in the late 1970's to prognosticate on the basis of absolutely honest and scholarly sound opinion polls, one would have had to conclude that--while there were things which bred social criticism--the overall state of society was nevertheless far from its critical point.

In part, this was also another result of the well-known inclination toward conformist adjustment of attitudes in the face of sociological soundings.

Having by now followed such soundings for many years, I have concluded that respondents tend to express opinions which at a given point in time fit more or less closely whatever is deemed socially and publicly acceptable. Respondents shun obviously nonconformist opinions even when they are ready to give vent to some moderate criticism of one aspect or another. It is probable that one of the factors which affect such posturing derives from the tendency--well known to sociologists and psychologists--to assimilate patterns regarded as socially binding.

Do I infer from this that sociological opinion polls are useless? By no means! In this respect some Polish methodological experiences have been of major significance, to mention just the most valuable research done by the Center for Public Opinion Research on the so-called coefficient of optimism. It has indicated fairly faithfully the vacillation of opinions in forecasting what the immediate future is apt to bring.

I would, however, steadfastly defend my conviction that it might prove rather risky to treat opinion polls as a sufficient source of information on the potential social tensions and imminent states of crisis. As has happened in the past, it might turn out that the perceived picture, based on such soundings, might become brutally outdated by reality.

One has, therefore, to look for additional methods of preparing warning forecasts.

All the crises we have gone through during the entire period of People's Poland were strongly conditioned by economic factors. To put it in a most generalized way, they have confirmed what Michal Kalecki had written about them. Over 20 years ago, in his book "The Theory of Growth of the Socialist Economy in Outline," Kalecki warned against the consequences of overly "optimistic" economic planning, that is to say, against setting up planned targets beyond the capacity of the national economy. In dealing with this phenomenon, Kalecki noted:

"...underfulfillment of unrealistic plans ultimately affects mainly consumption. There is, after all, a natural tendency to maintain the continuity of the investment processes in order to avoid the need to freeze capital in unfinished projects. One should not, however, underestimate the damage wrought by the underfulfillment of plans in the area of consumption. The resulting widespread despondency brings not only multiple consequences for economic life, but--what is just as important--affects very unfavorably the consciousness of socialist society."

This warning remained ignored both in the 1960's and in the 1970's. Tightly drawn--"optimistic"--plans brought about not only economic breakdowns and capital freeze, but mass social frustration as well. Society, understandably, plunged into despair once it became evident that the "optimism" of economic plans assumed all the characteristic features of a voodoo economy.

All of us swear nowadays that we are never going to repeat the same mistakes again. Alas, the point is that in the past, too, nobody deliberately intended to commit such errors. We have, therefore, to ponder the economic indicators of imminent crises. That is the duty of economists, whom--if only for

lack of sufficient competence—I do not intend to relieve of this chore. But it seems obvious that we should design a sufficiently sensitive system of economic indicators to alert us to such phenomena as overdraft of capital earmarked for investment, disturbed balance of labor, growth of unplanned inflation, deteriorated living standard indicators. Interdisciplinary systematic research on consumption patterns in Polish society, carried out in Poland since 1971, has brought us some interesting materials in this area. However, the will to make use of such materials is no less needed. They must enter into everyday circulation as a major set of economic indicators which point out the imminent threats.

I would like to be perfectly understood in this matter. I am well aware that every economy has its "fat" years and its "lean" ones. We would only be deceiving ourselves if we expected our economy to proceed always from one success to another. That would be unrealistic, if only because the Polish economy—like any other—is linked to the world economy, whose development follows an irregular, zigzag course. It is, however, realistic to demand that, prior to any decisionmaking of strategic significance, all the data which indicate the state of the economy—both in its macrosocial aspect and in the "micro" one, as reflected in the family household—should be thoroughly known well in advance. After all, when one knows the state of the economy, the necessary corrections of the economic policy can be carried out early enough, along with opportune launching of political actions liable to weaken the consequences of unfavorable economic processes. Nothing can substitute for wise and realistic planning, but a correct diagnosis of unfavorable phenomena might bring necessary corrections in time.

Scholarly knowledge of the social sciences and commonsense experience both indicate that in those periods which precede major social tensions the growth of various phenomena of social pathology can be clearly noticed: crime, drunkenness, drug abuse, loose labor discipline, etc. Scholars have aptly described the machinery of mutual linkage. To put it in most general terms, phenomena of social pathology are most effectively prevented not by legal repression (although I do not ignore its role), but by specific types of social links which determine human behavior.

The growth of social pathology indicates that this linkage has been undercut, that occurrences of social anomie—that is to say, partial or total decomposition of social links—have intensified; consequently, people move in a social vacuum and become less susceptible to standards and socially accepted behavior patterns. Such a vacuum becomes fairly easily refilled with alternative patterns and standards. It is precisely under conditions of social anomie that—provided a sufficiently strong impulse appears—great human masses can be pushed in a direction which, in the light of all previous events, might come as a total surprise.

Once more, I would like to clear up all possible misunderstandings. In dealing with the linkage between occurrences of social pathology and social tension which leads to acute crises, I have no intention of suggesting in any way that people most active in crisis situations (e.g., strike leaders) are bound to be some individuals tainted with an especially high degree of

social pathology. That is a different question, which--as far as I know--has not yet been seriously tackled in our country. But the rise of social pathology in large agglomerations should have warned us that--since all such phenomena stem from a common source--some imminent processes of the kind which might have emerged openly as dangerous social tensions had been maturing within those agglomerations. Such common roots are nothing but anomie, frustration of standards, and protest--unconscious at first--against what was regarded as the officially accepted standard.

For this reason alone, watchful following of vacillating indicators of pathology is of major importance not only for those who deal professionally with criminality or with other deviations. It is also important for a diagnosis of indicators of social tension, which left to their own devices might--or even must--degenerate into a state of crisis.

Linked to this is another issue, psychological in nature but going beyond the narrowly defined problems of social pathology. I have in mind the problem of a sense of unfairness, which in the idiom of social pathology is known as deprivation.

Deprivation is a mental state caused by the fact that somebody did not make it. The degree of deprivation which affects the mental state of an individual depends on how significant his failure has been, and how important the problems involved in his failure are. It has been known for a long time that acute states of deprivation are reflected in aggression, which in some cases assumes a pathological degree. The only major attempt to act against an ethnic minority (the 1981 anti-Gypsy excesses at Konin) took place in a period of intense social crisis, when the level of deprivation experienced by our society was exceptionally high.

Let us look at the issue more closely. Even though in our country--thanks to its high degree of ethnic homogeneity--tensions and conflicts between various nationality groups are much less pronounced than in many other countries, even in that area there did surface some postures, indicating a distressing deterioration of the state of social tension... This issue cannot, however, be reduced to ethnic postures only. In every society every intensification of group conflicts--in the form, for instance, of antagonism between various social strata (antiworker, anti-peasant, anti-intellectual and so on)--indicates some mental tension within the communities affected by such antagonism, tension which unconsciously seeks escape in denouncing selected "scapegoats" of one kind or another. Under such circumstances, engaging in polemics with pronouncements which reflect this kind of antagonism (as a rule ineffective polemics, since prejudices are not very susceptible to rational persuasion) seems less important than realizing what the emergence of such phenomena actually signifies. It is a warning which should not be ignored. Group prejudices and antagonisms are, after all, just a cover for a pathological state of deprivation, which in a slightly different situation might find expression in mass actions of overtly crisis-like character.

Additional symptoms of social tension can be found in the area of social structure, or--to be more precise--in two of its aspects: the distribution of assets and the equality of life opportunities.

For 40 years our society has been shaped by the prevailing influence of socialist ideology, and has assimilated an intense conviction that attractive social assets should be distributed fairly and that people--irrespective of the incidental circumstances of birth into one family or another--should enjoy equal opportunities.

Since this is the case, it is easy to understand that all the occurrences which indicate that reality is at cross-purposes with those ideals must breed social tension. There is no need whatsoever to inquire whether the consequences of being aware of such cross-purposes have already been present in the shared consciousness. An analysis of the objective state of affairs--if only measured by differentials in the objective material situation or in relative opportunities for young people of worker or peasant descent to achieve a more attractive status within the social structure--will clearly suffice. A lot has been written recently about this, but one should keep in mind that the problem has not only its moral and ideological dimensions. It is not solely a question of keeping faith with the ideological tenets of socialism. It is also a question of opportune perceptibility and prevention of social tensions, which have always surfaced whenever too wide a chasm has divided reality from the socialist standards of justice. Sociological research of the social structure, provided it is sensitive enough to unfavorable occurrences that from the point of view of the socialist axiology are regarded as pathological, might contribute a great deal to the projection of an image of growing threats.

In the last place I would like to name some indicators of a purely political nature. This is not because I attach to them the least significance, but because they are of a slightly different nature than the indicators dealt up with till now.

All the earlier treated phenomena were--to a greater or lesser degree--susceptible to quantitative analysis, and therefore might have been dealt with in mathematical forecasts, based on modern computer technology. But political indicators (with minor, and in our case not the most essential exceptions, such as, for instance, measuring voter absenteeism), are different in nature. Very often some purely singular occurrences suffice to provide a warning, while other events of a more comprehensive character, though still unsusceptible to techniques of quantitative measurement, should be regarded as signals of especially alarming character.

Let us recall in this connection the year 1980--not the summer but the beginning of the year. The discussion that had preceded the Eighth PZPR Congress, followed by the congress itself, during which there came the rather unprecedented withdrawal from political life of the then prime minister, Piotr Jaroszewicz, all should have provided a significant indication of the growing political tension, even then sufficiently intense to reach the center of ruling power.

Moreover, there was no lack of historical precedents. The December 1970 crisis was preceded by major political tensions within the leading circles and by major changes in many political posts, in particular in 1968. The October 1956 turning point, too, had been "forecast" by tension and political changes at the top level of the power system.

It is a rule of political life that such problems, when they do occur, are treated with the greatest discretion, and the people directly involved, guided by a natural sense of loyalty, do everything possible to avoid any political publicity. But this does not alter the fact that such political events--coupled with others, mentioned earlier--provide warning indicators of imminent tension. It usually takes some time until we notice this indicative character of the political events just mentioned. But they, too, should be taken into account when we talk about setting up some "early warning signs."

The reader could object here that while all this might well be true, are social sciences capable of coping with warning forecasting?

My reply would be as follows. The methodological equipment of the contemporary social sciences is sufficient to undertake such a difficult task. Without further development of some scientific methods of forecasting, the results probably would remain limited and not altogether certain, but such methods can be developed only through the cognitive process itself. The difficulties are inherent in two other areas.

First of all, in the availability of source data, since without it no genuine forecasting is possible. That is only partially up to the scholars themselves; to a large degree it depends on decisions made within the state institutions that collect information and decide on its publication. Efficient statistical service, as well as sound and reliable information, constitute the material substance without which one cannot even dream of drawing correct conclusions about the future. That is why there will never be enough demands for maximal enlargement of the scope of information available to scholarly research on the state of society.

Second, the problem is inherent in the climate surrounding all forecasting activities. No one likes to be a Cassandra. Bringing bad news is one of the most difficult duties, of both the physician and of the scholar. In matters of political concern the difficulty of warning forecasting derives from the fact that whoever warns in time, even before symptoms of the crisis phenomena become visible to the naked eye (and by then it is too late for effective prophylaxis), is liable to incur the charge of pessimism, in the past often used successfully to shut mouths. The scholarly community must therefore have some immunity to external reactions, while those to whom--for reasons of their responsibility for the course of public affairs--such warning forecasts are mainly addressed must acknowledge the need for candor. Today in particular, when we are gradually but systematically overcoming the crisis, we should keep those problems in mind, and talk about them openly.

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GENESIS, COURSE OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTION DEBATED

AU210701 Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 11, Nov 84 pp 116-130

[Article by Henryk Cholaj: "About the Theory of Socialist Revolution"--first two paragraphs are NOWE DROGI introduction]

[Text] The origins and course of socialist revolution in Poland have for a long time been an issue of ideological struggle. It is natural that this issue continues to stimulate theoretical discussions, which are of great importance for the times we live in.

Professor Henryk Cholaj's article is the first of a cycle of publications, which from various theoretical positions illuminate this crucial issue, one that is significant against the background of 40 years of the PPR. [end of NOWE DROGI introduction]

One of the July issues of ZYCIE LITERACKIE Wladyslaw Loranc published a brilliant article under the title "40 Years Are Up." This article was devoted mostly to the issues of the construction of the foundations of socialism in People's Poland. In particular, the author formulated a thesis, in line with which "there is no doubt that we have constructed the foundations of socialism."

We are not directly interested in this article in order to search for an answer to the question of what level of maturity the construction of socialism in People's Poland has reached in the past 40 years. This is another task. It is actually a secondary task, because what should be done first is to explain the methodological aspect of the issue, that is, to determine the criteria in line with which it is possible to correctly formulate an answer to the question concerning the advancement of socialist construction in People's Poland.

However, W. Loranc's article also implies a certain methodological position. He writes:

"On what objective reasons is it possible to base the assertion that the foundations of socialism in our country have been built and on what objective reasons the assertion that, against the position assumed by the Seventh Party Congress, the process of socialist construction has not been completed? We base the assertion that the foundations of socialism in Poland have been built on four premises:

--"The solution of the problem of power and its stabilization through the establishment of the worker-peasant state and of the institutions proper to the socialist state;

--"The completion of the reforms that abolished the rule of the propertied classes and, consequently, the classes themselves (the agrarian reform, the nationalization of industry); this has created the permanent political-economic bases of the worker-peasant alliance, which is a condition for the irreversibility of the socialist changes in Poland;

--"The revolution in education and culture has enabled us to train some 7 million intellectuals, most of them hailing from worker and peasant backgrounds; this has consolidated primarily the position of the workers class as a decisive social force;

"We have concluded and continue to effectively strengthen a system of international alliances that help stabilize the country's position and protect the social character of the state; this fact is an important factor in the balance of global power between socialism and capitalism.

"All the political changes have determined the irreversibility of the socialist transformations in Poland. An analysis of all the aspects of economic and social relations makes it possible to assert that we have built the foundations of socialism in our country not only in the political, but also in the economic and social spheres.

"We have not been able to implement some of our tasks of various importance--tasks that are necessary so that, having built the foundations of socialism, we can complete the process of socialist construction and go over to the stage of establishing a developed socialist society."

It is impossible to share W. Loranc's position concerning the interpretation of the notion of "foundations of socialism," which we will prove later on. However, while differing with him on specifics, we have to praise his general methodological approach. First, searching for an answer to the questions concerning the evaluation of the results of socialist construction in Poland, he--in line with the present level of scientific knowledge in this regard--refers to the notion of "foundations of socialism," which is a sine qua non for any sensible discussions of the subject. Second, he not only uses the multiple notion of "foundations of socialism," but also applies [phrase indistinct] on the arguments that refer to the real facts, which characterize the course of the Polish historical process. This means that he does not use the method of proclaiming his position and asking others to believe in it. Fourth, his method is not the one that has become so popular in our country, namely, the method of labeling and branding people who think differently and the method of flaunting revolutionary phraseology while displaying a nihilistic attitude toward the past. This means that we should laud him for and imitate his example of creating, through the facts, the atmosphere of a businesslike discussion of the issues that are important, among other things, for carrying out serious studies of the PZPR long-term program. Fifth, W. Loranc attempts to realistically approach the results of socialist construction in People's Poland. The principle of [words indistinct]

However, W. Loranc's meritorious position on the period of transition from capitalism to socialism cannot be accepted for theoretical reasons.

According to W. Loranc, the building of the foundations of socialism does not amount to the building of socialism, that is, to the completion of the transition period from capitalism to socialism. As a result, he thinks that after the foundations of socialism have been built it is necessary to continue along "the road to the final goal, which is the completion of the process of socialist construction in Poland." However, such a view cannot be reconciled with the theory of socialist construction.

It is also difficult to agree with W. Loranc insofar as the exact identification or characterization of the foundations of socialism in the individual spheres of the life of society are concerned. For example, he wholly ignores the issue of the material and technical base of society (the level of the maturity of production forces). However, without such a base it is impossible to truly socialize production means. This socialization is one of the economic features of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

W. Loranc does not mention at all the socialization of the means of production as the basic and valid criterion of the completion of the transition period, a criterion that betokens the construction of the bases of socialism in the economy. It is hard to assume that he rejects this principled criterion, which is regarded as particularly important if not most important, albeit as not the only one. However, being silent on this issue and the simultaneous assertion that the foundations of socialism in the economy have been built in Poland might suggest that the author has embraced a pluralistic attitude, which means that he regards as socialist the many-tiered character of the economy during the transition period in Poland (marked by a strong organization of the private economy dealing with small goods and by a capitalist organization).

W. Loranc's position gives rise to the least number of reservations with regard to the political and international spheres of society's life, which he identifies correctly. However, there is an extensive sphere of social awareness, which W. Loranc does not single out and does not in any way analyze. After all, one can approach the definition of the foundations of socialism only in a comprehensive way, which means that it is impossible to assert that these foundations have been built in a given country if the socialist transformations have failed to include a basic sphere of social life.

Finally, it is necessary to draw attention to the issue of class alliances, especially the worker-peasant alliance as a synonym of interclass relations, a definite level of whose development W. Loranc regards as an indicator of the implementation of the foundations of socialism in the sphere of social life.

W. Loranc was able to assert that the foundations of socialism in Poland have been built only because he views this notion in a manner that differs from the proper one. But how are we to define this notion in a theoretically correct manner? This is the task which the author of this article has posed for himself. In this way this article amounts to a polemic with W. Loranc's theoretical position.

The political economy does not view the socialist system as a whole. It views only one sphere of it--the general economic laws of the construction and development of socialism. The sphere of the economy is primarily linked to the socialist socialization of the means of production, which is a law that continues to make its way under the conditions of the many-tiered economy of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. This is one of the most important laws of the transition period, because the main goal of this period is expressed by the socialist transformation of the private ownership of the means of production. The laws of socialist socialization begin to operate after political power has been won under the necessary objective and subjective conditions.

Modern Marxist literature continues to accept to an ever increasing extend the view that various stages of the socialist socialization of production are the basis of the period of the development of socialism. Such an approach toward explaining the objective foundation for singling out the successive stages (phases) of the development of socialism has not become possible all at once. The truth is that it has only been in the past few years that various simplifications that were present in the old literature of this issue have been overcome. Many innovations have emerged, especially insofar as the comprehension of the meaning of the socialist socialization of production as a multilateral process of many stages, one that is not devoid of contradictions, is concerned. At the same time, it became obvious that the socialist countries continued to develop in a manner that was much more complicated than had been stipulated by the theory of the gradual and constant rise in the level of the socialization of production. The negative results of the attempts to unjustifiably anticipate the socialization of the means of production become obvious. It was also obvious that, in line with economic realism, use was made of nonsocialized work in some sectors of the national economy because of the historical vitality of some forms of individual work. The construction of the economic foundations of socialism calls for completing the higher "floors" of social life, which means that a way of life has to be changed and, especially, that existence has to be socialized. In view of this, socialization is primarily a way of production, although it has its extra-economic dimension in that it applies to some spheres of social life that are elements of a way of life.

In this way the question arises as to the role of the categories of the socialization of the means of production as a criterion for singling out the general stages (and not specific and historical ones in the case of the individual countries) of the development of socialism. Can socialization play the role of the criterion of the general periodization of the development of socialism and, if so, to what extent?

According to an article by A. Cypko published in EKONOMISTA, issue one, 1981, "during the long period after the socialist revolution in Russia the problem of the goals of socialism was usually identified with the problem of the means and conditions for going over to socialism. That is why it was usual that the criteria of socialism were associated primarily with achievements in the field of socializing the means of production and with the success in eliminating the old, presocialist economic setup.... It is necessary to realize that the final goal of all socialist transformations is not the process of transformations, but its ultimate result--the good of the working classes and the happiness and

prosperity of every individual.... The fact that the masses have become aware of the essence of socialism and its main goals is a symbol of our times.... The orientation of our time in the direction of the true goals of socialism and of the link between the birth of the construction of a new society and its [word indistinct] goals--this link is of crucial importance for Marxism--have not as yet been given the necessary place in the work devoted to research into socialist society..., while the tasks of the further progress of socialism are being wholly identified with the principles of the further socialization and management of the means of production."

The primary impression is that A. Cypko is looking for a solution to the dilemma in question in an alternative way (either, or). This cannot be accepted because of its faulty one-sidedness. The complementary solution proposed by S. Widerszpil in his book "Development of Polish Modern Society," published in Warsaw in 1979, is better. He writes on pages 6 and 7:

"I treat the process of real socialization, one that involves both the qualitative transformations of property relations and class structures as well as the development of property relations and class structures as well as the development of production forces, and that serves the implementation of the main goal of socialism of ensuring social and individual prosperity and of creating conditions for a free and comprehensive development of all citizens, as the main dimension of socialist changes. This process also involves the working people's indirect and direct participation in management.

"The socialization of work and production is a prerequisite for developing socialist democracy and for making individuals social creatures who engage in various activities that benefit larger social groups and that are not connected with the personal affairs and destiny of these individuals.

"Real socialization has the nature of a synthetic criterion of the development of socialist society--a development that is viewed from the angle of the structure of the social formation and the larger social setups.

"The other feasible prospect for analyzing social changes and the extent to which socialist society has developed is the prospect for individual existence, for the daily life of individuals, for their lives in the family, and for their activities in various social spheres and situations. From this viewpoint I consider the way of life of individuals (and groups of individuals) as a criterion of progress of socialist society.

"The two prospects have a close connection analytically and complement each other. The macrosocial and individual levels are mutually complementary (and are determined by the general social conditions and formation structures). They may also be marked by disproportions in development and by contradictions, which assert themselves on the surface of phenomena in the shape of various difficulties and shortcomings."

The Marxist-Leninist theory of socialist socialization knows of no contradiction between goals and means. After all, the essence of the economic socialization of the means of production in socialism consists in the subordination of social production to the interests of the entire society. The interests of society

determine the goal of production. The subordination of the production means to the general social goal promotes the economic implementation of socialist ownership. Moreover, progress in the real socialization of production means depends not only on whether it takes place in the interest of society, but also on whether it takes place through the agency of society--through the participation of the masses in the organization and management of production and so on. That is why the first and decisive criterion of real socialist socialization is ensuring the priority of the general social interests and the extent to which the goal of socialist production is implemented. This is what the issue is on the theoretical plane. However, things are different if the meaning of socialization has been simplified. In such a case one must not criticize theory. One should criticize a faulty interpretation of theory or the errors committed in the practical policy of socialization.

Let us also add that, on the other hand, a rigid consideration of the extent to which social goals are implemented as a criterion of real socialization may lead to an omission of the criteria of socialization applying to the conditions of implementation of these goals--conditions that exist in the sphere of production forces and the sociopolitical conditions for the implementation of social goals.

Not all kinds of conditions are of equal significance for the individual stages of the development of socialism. Some criteria concerning conditions may in a situation be mapped out as goals, the implementation of which is necessary in order to ensure going over to a higher stage, at which the broad goals of socialist production may be implemented.

As for identifying progress in socializing production means with the criteria of the periodization of the development of socialism, it is necessary to state that the criteria for completing the period of transition from capitalism to socialism (in the same way as the criteria for developed socialism) concern all the basic spheres of social life and not only the sphere of material production. Socialization is the main objective law of the development of the economic sphere, but not of all the remaining spheres of social life. This means that we must have a comprehensive and complex approach to evaluating the extent to which society has advanced along the road to socialist development.

Because every society, including the society finding itself in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, is a definite factor in economic, social, political, and spiritual spheres; that is, is a social organism, it is necessary to take this fact into consideration when viewing the criteria for completing the period of transition. This is because the very notion of criteria as a yardstick of the level of society's development should characterize the level of the development of society as a whole. As a historical form of human society, socialism constitutes precisely an "integral" social organism. From this viewpoint the criterion for the maturity of socialism (built principle or developed) is a composite of criteria, because it is impossible to comprehend socialism by ignoring some important sphere of it.

However, it is common knowledge that when many partial criteria are at hand, it becomes necessary to establish a kind of subordination between them, especially if these criteria are not equal in terms of meaning. This inequality makes it necessary to single out the main criterion from among the other criteria. The answer to this question is common knowledge. From among the spheres of social life, theory singles out the defining sphere; that is, the sphere of material production. The criterion of periodization is connected mainly with the functioning of this sphere. Since material production constitutes the basis of every society and since people establish definite relations of production (economic relations), the laws of the development of material production are the basic (but not the only ones) laws of society's development.

In this way a comprehensive approach to the task of defining the criteria for completing the transition period must not in any way signify the recognition of the equality of the economic base and the ideological superstructure in the life of socialist society when determining the level of its maturity. This is because the thesis about the decisive significance of production relations does not lose its importance in any way. The scientific differences between the phases and stages of a new formation of Marxism-Leninism are seen by this thesis primarily in the extent to which society is economically mature. In the first place socialism signifies definite relations based on relations of ownership. Everything else in social life is of secondary importance and depends on this basic change.

The so-called systems-type approach to the criterion [kryterium] for constructing socialism must make allowances for the fact that relations among elements of a system display not only mutual dependence, but also subordination, which means that they create a certain hierarchy. Otherwise there would be a danger of a pluralistic concept of the so-called factors in the process of history. The way out is indicated by a materialistic comprehension of history, which sheds light on this nexus of factors and makes it possible to logically and meaningfully settle the issue by summoning the factor that constitutes the base of the entire setup of social life. The answer to the question whether it is possible to find an overriding factor among the many factors that are unequal in their importance is contained in the materialistic theory of social development, a theory that singles out from among all the spheres of social life the one defining sphere--the sphere of material production.

The main criterion that helps single out the individual stages in the development of socialist society (and previous formations) is production relations, in which the main features of this society are revealed. An analysis of the process by which socialism develops should take precisely this criterion as a point of departure, and the central point of this analysis should be, above all, the efforts to indicate changes in the system of production relations. These changes should be treated as the main standard indexes of society's commitment to the stage of socialism. (In this connection one should not omit the development of production forces, because such an unjustified omission makes it impossible to explain the development of production relations.) Economic relations have always been the basis of an entire system of social relations and their "carrier." However, there is more to it than the economics of socialism.

The very essence of socialism, which is an integral social organism, proves that one aspect of social life, even a decisive aspect, should not be taken as a criterion. The economic criterion [kryterium], especially if combined with the indexes of the class structure, is decisive, but is not absolute.

Since the life of socialist society must not be reduced to the issue of the socialist forms of production, the period of transition from capitalism to socialism must not be completed on the strength of a single criterion. This is why it is necessary to stress the point of view in line with which it is necessary to comprehensively determine the criteria for completing the transition period.

This finds its expression in the notion of the foundation of socialism in the main spheres of society's life, and not only in the sphere of the relations of production. As for this sphere, the accent is not on formal socialization, but on real socialization. The foundations of socialism are not only an economic notion, but a sociopolitical one as well. In this connection the construction of the foundations of socialism expresses a meaning that is not purely economic, but that is sociological in general.

The most important conditions for the life of all kinds of societies are material, sociopolitical, and spiritual conditions. That is why society's own foundations during an individual stage of its development are seen as various material, spiritual, and other conditions for the existence of a historically specific society--conditions that are adequate to the requirements of this society and that can be reproduced during its development. The functioning and development of society on its own foundations begin when the old structure of society has been abolished, when a new structure has been developed, and when new laws have begun to operate. In terms of life this means that the internal sources of the restoration of the old system have been eliminated.

By analogy, the definition of the foundations of socialism should not be applied to various conditions of the existence of society. The foundations of socialism denote a system of definite relations of production--of sociopolitical, ideological, and other relations, the establishment of which is the goal of socialist construction during the transition period. In other words, these are the main components of the implementation of the general goal, components without which there would be no international meaning of socialism in line with the principle that socialism does not exist as diverse entities. The establishment of the foundations of socialism is no more and no less than the development of the main features of society's organization, which are seen in the principal spheres of its life. After all, it is correct to say that socialism represents a definite economic, social, and political system. This is the main result of, at the same time, a criterion for completing the period of transition for capitalism to socialism.

The theoretical assumption, in line with which the transition period ends when the foundations of socialism have been established in the main spheres of social life presupposed the identification and division of these spheres. In this way we become inevitably confronted with the question as to which spheres of social life are the main spheres, in contrast to the other secondary spheres

or in contrast to those that do not undergo political transformations. In other words, the question is in what specific spheres of social life the foundations of socialism are to be established.

In this connection the assertion that the construction of socialism signifies the development of new production forces, new production relations, and a new superstructure is not enough. This is a rough division, one that is well-established, but one that is specific enough to fit in with the comprehensive notion of the foundations of socialism (although a new manner of production and a new superstructure are established during the transition period).

In this connection it is primarily necessary to explain the so-called sphere of social life. A sphere of this kind signifies a relatively independent and specific sector of man's activity. Each such sphere is indispensable for the existence and development of society, which means that it is an individual and developed area of man's activity.

One of the merits of historical materialism is the discovery of the general socioeconomic structure: production (which also covers the relationship between society and nature), relations of production and the resulting social relations, the political superstructure, and the forms of social awareness. That is why we talk about four main spheres (or secondary systems): the economic, social, political, and spiritual spheres, which were identified for the first time in correct sequence and mutual dependence by K. Marx and F. Engels.

This means that there is a theoretical concept of the main spheres of society's life, that K. Marx formulated this concept in his letter addressed to P. Annenkov on 28 December 1846, and that Lenin developed it. K. Marx wrote:

"Please assume a definite state of the development of man's production forces and you will receive a definite form of exchange and consumption. Please assume a definite level of the development of production, exchange, and consumption and you will receive a corresponding form of a social system and a corresponding organization of the family, estates, or classes--in a word, a corresponding society of citizens. Please assume such a society of citizens and you will receive a corresponding political system, which is merely an official expression of this society."

The same idea is present in "The Contribution to the Criticism of the Political Economy," in which K. Marx wrote: "All the aspects of these relations of production amount to society's economic structure and to a real foundation of the legal and political superstructure in line with the specific forms of social awareness. The manner of the production of material life is conditioned by the social, political, and spiritual process of life in general."

Let us recall at this point that the development of historical materialism also knows attempts at a different approach to the classification of the main spheres of society's life. In particular, we can mention the "five-tiered" scheme of G. Plekhanov, which he explained in his "Basic Problems of Marxism":

"If we wanted to briefly explain the views of Marx and Engels on the relation between the now famous 'foundation' and no less famous 'superstructure,' the result would be as follows: 1) the state of production forces; 2) the economic relations conditioned by this state; 3) the sociopolitical system stemming from a given economic foundation; and 4) social man's mentality partially defined by the economy and partially by the entire sociopolitical system, which has been produced by this mentality; as well as various ideologies reflecting the features of this mentality."

The particular features of the main spheres of society's life and the mechanism of their mutual influence are defined as follows:

Economic life covers the sphere of material production, which represent two sides: production forces and relations of production without which any production of material goods is impossible.

Singling out the socioeconomic aspect of the material-technical category of society's base permits one to speak about a given society possessing its own technical base that is appropriate to it, as opposed to an economic base in the strict sense of the word. The concept "own" indicates the social nature of this base during the emergence of a given system. Material production not only encourages self-development, but also acts as an encouragement for other spheres of social life. Material production is the firmest foundation of society, also in the sense that it brings the remaining spheres to life.

The concept of social relations basically covers the concept of society's social structure, which consists of this or that social class, professional group, and so on. This is a sum total of historically-shaped human communities and of the relationships that exist between them. This sphere is directly dependent on economics and is at the same time a concretization, enrichment, and development of the economic sphere because social relations are an extension of economic relations and are closely interrelated with them.

The political sphere of social life is shaped by economic and social-class relations, in other words it stems from these relations. Politics is created by social classes and groups in order to express their interests. The need for these politics is dictated primarily by conflicting interests in the economic sphere (according to V. Lenin, politics is the most concentrated expression of economics, but nevertheless possesses priority over economics). When describing the political sphere, we avail ourselves of the concept of the political organization of society or the political system. Because of its functions, the political sphere has a complicated structure. Its features are public organizations and institutions, in other words political parties, the state, and political relations such as rights, freedom, and so on.

In the spiritual sphere, ideas and views are formed which enable people to get to know and understand the real conditions of their life, which in turn enables them to adapt themselves to these conditions. Elements of this sphere are the various forms of sociopolitical, economic, historical, legal, moral, artistic, philosophical, religious, or atheist consciousness, and so on. This sphere is institutionalized and possesses a complex structure as well as two levels, a

theoretical-ideological level and a common level, which mirrors social life on the basis of daily practical experience. This latter level does not provide knowledge of society as a whole and of its development laws. The theoretical-ideological level is not limited to scientific knowledge; value systems are also a part of it. This is a sphere in which not only social and individual consciousness occur, but in which people create ideas. Economic and socio-political factors are active and mutually counteractive in every single area of this sphere.

The foundations of socialism in the main spheres of society's life may be described by using this or that terminology, synonyms, and expressions with similar meanings. There are differences between individual authors in this respect.

Thus, the technical foundation for socialism, most frequently described as the material-technical base of socialism, is created by the great mechanized production in industry and agriculture, in other words by such a degree of really socialized production within the entire national economy that it permits the functioning of economic laws and the implementation of socialist principles.

The economic foundation in the strictly socialist sense of the word consists of the domination of socialist production relations and of a division of the entire national economy, both of these based on the social ownership of the means of production.

The foundation of socialism in the social sphere is created—as a result of the abolition of the exploiting classes and class antagonisms—by the newly-emerged social classes, in other words by the workers class that has replaced the former proletariat; by the socialist worker-peasant class in those countries where peasant agriculture was dominant prior to their revolution; by socialist integration; in other words, the emergence of different social groups as one whole; and by the alliance of the workers class with the peasant class and other social strata.

The political foundation of socialism is created by the working masses under the leadership of the workers class and its Marxist-Leninist party, which embraces in particular the institutional superstructure of the socialist state, the working masses democratic participation in government, and so on.

The foundation of socialism in the sphere of consciousness, sometimes called the cultural-ideological foundation of socialism, is created by a nation's high level of civilization, high ethics, the domination of a scientific world outlook, a humanist orientation in society's cultural life, and the shaping of a socialist type of personality. Revolution in the sphere of consciousness is a general principle behind the transformations that take place during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

The concept of four basic spheres of social life, in other words an economic, social, political, and spiritual sphere (the sphere of technical relations is separate) is part of the general theory of socioeconomic formation. It is an important supplement to this theory.

In any case, the modern concept of the basic spheres of social life, in other words a concept that suits the current level of scientific knowledge, cannot push aside the sphere of international life, which leads one to the conclusion that it is useful to extend the category of socialist attitudes to include this sphere as well.

International relations are an extension of those social relations that have already taken shape on a national scale but nevertheless represent a special kind of relations (between human societies), whose emergence is influenced by a series of factors. These relations create a definite system and--just as relations inside individual states do--they represent various social and political themes. After the setting up of a world socialist system, we are living not only within the sphere of individual countries, but also within a system of socialist countries.

As far as the end of the transition period from capitalism to socialism is concerned, it is difficult to give a precise practical, and sometimes even theoretical, definition of the boundaries of certain spheres of social life. If the difficulties within the economic foundation or within class relations are minor, the situation is different with the spiritual sphere of the entire so-called superstructure. Here the words of K. Marx are fully applicable, who wrote as follows in the introduction to his "contribution to a Critique on Political Economy" on the subject of the social revolution era:

"A turnabout in the entire huge superstructure is occurring, together with a change in economic attitudes. When examining such a turnabout, one must always distinguish between a material turnabout in the economic conditions of production which can be defined with a precision applicable to the natural sciences on the one hand, and on the other to the legal, political, religious, philosophical, or artistic forms, in other words the ideological forms by which people identify this conflict and fight for its resolution."

A sign of typological realism is therefore the drawing of conclusions from the above fact. If a given criterion cannot be [word indistinct] in nature, it is essential to define a critical quantity which ought to be adopted by the criterion in question so that society's entry into the socialist development phase may be determined. Only changes to the economic sphere and to society's class structure can be clearly defined because they are able to be grasped in terms of quantity far better than, for example, the sphere of superstructure. Thanks to this, one can define stages of social development more accurately. As the departure from the economic sphere becomes greater, so the boundaries between individual stages in individual spheres of life become more blurred, which makes it difficult to divide these stages. As a result of an unequal development rate toward socialism by individual spheres of life, the boundaries between these spheres are unstable, and the characteristics on either side of a given boundary merge to create a blurred boundary. As a result, some features of the transitional period remain in the socialist society, and the solving of certain tasks may take longer than the period of transition.

The criteria for completing the transition period should be not only complex, but historic. This is a fundamental methodological requirement accompanying these criteria because the theoretical statements concerning criteria always fall out of historical context and are inevitably restricted. Some of the criteria governing the end of the transition period depend on concrete historic conditions. Therefore in order to correctly analyze the issue of the transition period and the criteria for ending it, it is above all necessary to review on what sort of situation and on what conditions the classicists of scientific socialism, especially Marx, have based this topic.

When thus presenting the issue of a transition period from capitalism to socialism (or communism), Marx had in mind the developed capitalist countries in which capitalism had embraced not only the cities, but also the rural areas. That is why Marx believed that in such developed countries, the transition from capitalism to socialism after the assumption of power by the workers class would be exceptionally short. K. Marx lived in an era of pre-monopolist capitalism and assumed that the proletarian revolution would take place in the main countries of Europe at almost the same time, with the simultaneous assumption that the world revolution would end in a rapid victory. Given these two prerequisites, K. Marx viewed the transition period as a historically comparatively short period. His view was perfectly understandable given the historical conditions and prerequisites which he used as his base of support. However, V. Lenin, who lived and worked in Russia which, unlike England and France, was not a developed country but a backward capitalist one, regarded the transition period as considerably longer. But one cannot dogmatically interpret V. Lenin's statements, as well as the still earlier statements of K. Marx, without taking into account the historical time and situation which determined these statements. Today, this issue must be viewed in the light of the present historical experience, and the theory of the transition period expounded. For example, an expression of a historic approach toward establishing criteria for the completion of socialist development is the currently added criterion involving the sphere of international relations, at a time when socialism is shaping itself within the framework of a community of many countries.

As for the material-technical base of socialism, however, this subject must also be approached historically. The material-technical base of socialism the way Marxists at the end of the 19th century imagined it was one matter, but an entirely different matter is the material-technical base at the end of the 20th century, at a time when a scientific-technical revolution is developing.

One can agree with O. Reinhold that the current level of consumption could be regarded inside a workers movement at the end of the 20th century as communist, and yet the current level of work productivity could have been regarded in the 1920's as the level attainable by a developed socialist society.

The problem of dividing up the development of socialism into stages always involves a definition of the criteria which end one stage and commence the next one. As far as the criteria permitting the determination of the end of the transition from capitalism to socialism are concerned, these should be objectively controlled by the very essence of the socioeconomic system. It is

essential to understand the socialism's essence, which manifests itself in socialism's basic forms, when precisely defining the scientific criteria for ending the transition period. A clear definition of the basic characteristics of socialism defines at the same time the task facing the transition period and the criteria for ending this period. The most important features of socialism are expressed in the concept of the foundations of socialism. In other words, the foundations of socialism are a complex of primary features that have materialized in all the important spheres of social life and whose presence turns a given society into a socialist one. Referring not to the above positive criterion (in other words, the one whereby the category of socialist attitude expresses the qualitative limited nature or separateness of socialism) but the negative criterion instead, one can say that the above category expresses the abolition of the features that are only applicable to presocialist socioeconomic structures, and reveals the absence of those features that are applicable to communism, the system of the future. The foundations of socialism manifest themselves as the result of the demolition of the foundations of capitalism.

The category "foundations of socialism" belongs to those fundamental concepts which have been worked out by modern science and which permit a general description of that stage of social maturity when the most important results of socialist transformations following the socialist revolution can be reviewed. In a sociological sense, the concept "One's own foundations of socialism" defines its nature, in other words it defines the entire shape of essential characteristics, laws, and principles which expresses the essence of a given social system. The monistic nature of socialism contains a unity of the characteristics, laws, and principles applicable to this system. Ignoring the characteristic features of socialism would lead to the view that socialism is merely a transition stage combining features of "immature communism" with those of "leftover capitalism," and would lead to a negation of the qualitative meaning of socialism.

In contrast to many former statements, one can say that the transition period is a period of building the foundations of socialism, whereby creating the basis for socialism in basic spheres of social life is equal to the end of the transition period. But what is the content of the category "foundations of socialism" or "one's own foundations of socialism?"

In his "Critique of the Gotha Program," K. Marx writes of socialism that we are dealing with a communist society, but not the kind that has developed "on its own foundation." Applying Marxist terminology ("one's own foundation") to socialism creates the impression that the idea of socialist development on its own foundation is contrary to what Marx said and polemizes with him, signifying an alleged revision of Marx's view in this matter. Opponents of the view that already-built socialism develops on its own foundation maintain that applying the category of socialist foundations to society's socialist development phase is quite contrary to Marx's theory. Accusations like this, however, are unjustified and should be rejected. The problem of the alleged discrepancy, in this case with Marx's theory, is explained in detail by P. N. Fiedoseyev in "Philosophy and Scientific Knowledge":

"As we know, the question on what basis socialism develops has been viewed for a long time from the angle of K. Marx's description of the transition period from capitalism to socialism. We are dealing with a communist society, but

not the kind that has developed on its own foundations but, on the contrary, with a society that is only just separating itself from the capitalist society and which therefore still bears the label of the old society from which it emerged in every respect--economic, moral, and intellectual.' This description is justified for every country in the first stage of socialist development. But it is correct to believe that their further development takes place on a base that has been inherited from the capitalist society and, given these circumstances, try to understand the nature of political relations and the laws which express them. There are too many conditions to permit the view that development takes place on one's own foundation based on the production forces and manufacturing strength created by the new society. For development on one's own foundation signifies that socialism at this stage is faced with conditions and prerequisites formed by itself or, in other words, produced by itself."

Thus, it is difficult to speak of a discrepancy between Marx's theory and method. However, we are dealing with a further concretization and development of one and the same concept of socialism. Multilateral historical experience has permitted Marx's theory to be concretized without altering its essence. The idea of the existence of one's own base of socialism is an important new theoretical generalization and an example of the creative development of Marxism-Leninism on the basis of the new and rich practical experience which Marx had at his disposal.

"The long suffering of nations" that fills the transition period permits the final elimination of the vestiges of capitalism. Nevertheless, certain features remain which remind one of the former methods of production, for example the relationship between goods and money. Under the new system, these features achieve a quite new meaning (quality) everywhere, thanks to which they may no longer be regarded as capitalist features that clash with the essence of socialism. By the way, Marx viewed the first phase of communist formation in a broad historical perspective and explained the existence of capitalist vestiges by the fact that the problem of equality and inequality, justice and injustice remains as a remnant of the past, although the content of these is different to what it was under capitalism.

Socialism does not develop on its own foundation, but creates this foundation. Before the concept of developed socialism was formed, people believed that socialism does not have its own foundations, if we base ourselves on what Marx said. But the above thesis of Marx cannot be interpreted while ignoring the fact that for Marx, the entire new formation and both its phases possess the same socioeconomic basis, in other words one type of ownership of the means of production, the social nature of work, and a lack of goods-money relationships. It is this very foundation that emerges as a result of the transformation of the foundations of capitalism. Secondly, it seems that the change in the social content of these relationships and categories is reason enough to apply to them a socialist content and regard them as socialist. Finally, Marx writes about a socialist society that has "only just" emerged from the capitalist society, whereas a society that has traveled an entire stage of the socialist development path can no longer be considered as socialist.

Views about what differentiates a socialist society from a capitalist one should be strictly drawn from historical facts and development processes. Without a connection with these facts and processes, they have no theoretical or practical value. That is why in order to throw a proper light on the theory of the development of socialism on its own foundation, it is necessary to take into consideration the enormous difference between the times when the "Critique of the Gotha Program" was written and today's times. Dissipating F. Lasalle's illusions about socialism, Marx stressed the inevitable faults of socialism and the inadequate level of production strength it had inherited from Marxism. Here one should not forget that Marx assumed that the socialist revolution would win at the same time in all of the most developed European capitalist countries. In the "Critique of the Gotha Program," he revealed from a historical-philosophical point of view the objective conditions behind the emergence of a new society and the ties between capitalism and socialism on the one hand, and the differences between capitalism and socialism on the other.

Yet the modern approach toward the issue of socialism's development on its own foundation stresses the fundamental difference between socialism and capitalism. This approach has appeared relatively recently. During the development of the theory, concepts behind the foundations of socialism altered. The broadly-conceived foundations of socialism as a category relating to the basic spheres of social life are a new achievement in the development theory of a socialist society. Suffice it to say here that the category of "foundations of socialism" which was mentioned in Soviet literature until recently (and still is in Polish literature) was identified with this category's economic basis. That is why the concept of "foundations of socialism" was regarded as separate from the concept of "economic foundations of socialism" for entire decades, and the concepts of "foundations of socialism" and "basis for socialism" were regarded as identical. It is also worth mentioning the interpretation given to the concept "foundation of socialist economy" or "economic foundation of socialism." The creation of the foundation of a socialist economy is considered to mean that industry and agriculture are joined to each other on two pedestals, socialist agriculture and private peasant agriculture, but on one common socialist pedestal as a result of the abolition of the multifaceted nature of the national economy (the creation of a foundation for a socialist economy was synonymous with the country's industrialization and agriculture's collectivization). This is therefore a category similar to the category "ways of production."

It seems that the foundation of socialist economy should be taken to mean the material-technical base of socialism presented by the great mechanized industry, and the guarantee that socialist production relations rule not only in industry but also in agriculture, and not only in cities but also in rural areas. The economic foundation of socialism is a historically precise concept. It will change and become richer in line with the degree to which the material production processes in the national economy become socialized, and depending on the technological level of the production apparatus in the world.

While speaking about the evolution of the way certain categories are understood, attention should be drawn to the expression "building socialism in principle," which was used in old literature and which was one stage further in the building

of socialism than the "building of the foundations of socialism." The expression "building socialism in principle" has two sides to it: When relating to the entire earlier period, it implies that the transition period is over, but when relating to the future period, it indicates the commencement of the development of socialism in itself. If by "foundations of socialism" one understands the entire complex of fundamental socialist characteristics occurring in all the important spheres of social life--and this interpretation is becoming increasingly common today--then there is no basic difference between today's frequently used concept of "foundations of socialism" and the former concept of "socialism built in principle." These concepts stem from the same source (though they were once used in different contexts); the creation of the foundations of socialism does not mean that the stage preceding the building of socialism in principle has been reached, but that socialism really is being built, and at the same time both concepts express one and the same level of socialist development.

Despite this, according to some Polish authors, building the foundations of socialism means the same as building socialism in principle because both concepts define one and the same level of the new system's maturity, in other words the end of the transition from capitalism to socialism, in other words the time when socialism enters the next stage of formation or when the functioning and development of socialism in itself and on its own foundation commences.

Thus a difference has come to light between the concept "foundation of economics" which covers the material-technical and economic foundation (base) of socialism, and the concept "foundations of socialism," which also applies to those spheres of social life outside economics. This means that identifying both categories with each other is justified--and this is so even in the economic sphere, because creating the foundation of socialist economy assumes that socialist forms of production dominate industry and agriculture. Hence in the economic sphere too, the building of the foundations of socialism is not limited to just building a pedestal, for it is still essential to "add" to this pedestal an appropriate material-technical base, socialize the means of production in cities and rural areas, and create a socialist economic mechanism. Therefore, after the socialist method of production has been established, creating the foundation for socialism still takes a certain amount of time.

Building the foundations of socialism means in turn that a socialist society is only just being formed in principle, although still not fully. The foundations and pedestal are already there, but the entire building is still not standing in a "ready" form. Therefore, it is essential to strengthen the basis for socialism and completely finish the construction of socialism. This means the same as creating a mature and developed socialist society.

CSO: 2600/390

NEGATIVE VIEW OF LAW ENFORCEMENT BY SOCIETY DENOUNCED

Warsaw TU I TERAZ in Polish No 51, 19 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Jan Rem: "Police"]

[Text] Our television is now showing the U.S. serial "Hill Street Blues." It is a good serial, because there is little fiction. It seems to imitate a documentary film. Polish audiences willingly spend their time with the good guys serving in the New York police force. They are wise, honorable, usually sentimental, good people. Because of their private troubles and foibles, they are also humane people. They sometimes are bombastic, but never overwhelming. They succumb to various innocent weaknesses, or exceptionally, less innocent ones, such as, for example, corruption. In sum, every television viewer who persistently watches this serial, begins to love American police.

It is an interesting thing that in the United States, serials and single feature films which evoke good feelings toward the police are constantly being made. Thus, Americans are, without interruption, sustained in a loving, pro-police trance. We can imagine its intensity by judging from the crumbs which reach our television and large screens. One time we are enchanted by the apparent clod Colombo, who is both a funny little man and a genius of intelligence in the rank of a lieutenant; ingenious criminal fables are the element in which he operates. Kojak is a superman with the heart of a dove, a wise boss and a charming man bursting with vitality. In the movies one sees various stories about lonely, honorable policemen single-handedly breaking up superpowerful criminal organizations, or about unlucky policemen downtrodden by life, who nevertheless overcome evil. From the example of what is being shown, one can imagine the size and power of the police propaganda in the United States.

In the United States there are many different, independent from each other, separately operating formations of the police type, which on the basis of different principles on various occasions cooperate. We often learn from films that they compete with each other or even trip each other up. This diversity from the point of view of propaganda has considerable advantages. From time to time, U.S. public opinion is alarmed by, for example, news about various kinds of secret intelligence activity which does not exclude murder and organizing upheavals in other countries. These big, black spots flooding the

image of one police organization in no way, however, darken the picture of another. Attempts to kill Fidel Castro do not remove the halo from above the head of Kojak, an officer of the New York City police, and a corruption scandal in the FBI has no impact on Lt Colombo. Nobody suspects that the picture of the station on Hill Street is perfumed only because somewhere else dirty police affairs came to the surface. In any case, the reception of popular serials is much greater and they are more suggestive than press information revealing the pieces of bad truth. Under the protective umbrella of visual American propaganda, police can prosper without worrying about the social resonance of all that which the press, induced by local political fighting or some other motive, draws out.

Now let us imagine that it is completely different in the United States than it is. Television serials and films about police are made rarely and clumsily. It is true that on the screen we see brave, irreproachable policemen, who sometimes are even ingenious, nevertheless they resemble Colombo or Kojak as much as a mannequin resembles Marilyn Monroe.

Let us now further imagine that three or four American police officers conspire and carry out a notorious murder with provocative intentions. Public opinion is in a fever of excitement.

Let us now imagine that there exist in the United States forces which make it their goal to shake the existing social order because as long as it holds together, they have no chance of achieving a political success. They form organizations specializing in fighting the police. To this purpose they exploit the moods which developed after the murder that shook the United States nearly as much as the killing of Kennedy. What do they do? They exhume from the rich life of the United States for various crimes whose perpetrators were not discovered, and tragic events of various background. Nearly everything bad that happens they ascribe to the police, asserting that the police are not fighting crime, but causing it. The police itself in the name of its various goals steals, murders and the like. Thus if a policeman stops you on the street, beware, because he certainly wants to kill you. If someone broke into your apartment and burglarized it, it must have been a policeman. If the police search for a robber, they certainly only pretend to do so, while in reality protect and hide him.

Of course, such antipolice propaganda created by organizations which do not have access to television stations and press of wide circulation would be deprived of major resonance. We must imagine, therefore, that the majority of foreign journalists stationed in the United States are more interested in overturning its order and state structure than in acting in accordance with truth and integrity. Thus, if a few people who fight the police write on a sheet of paper that a merchant in Podunk was certainly robbed by the police, this will immediately be broadcast all over the world. Not only that: for a few days it will be the chief news from the United States. Not only will it be news: all articles and commentaries about the United States broadcast in the world will spread the truth that the United States is a country whose life is dominated by daily provocations and police crime, while the population

trembles with fear. At the same time no other news from the United States will appear and the whole United States will be reduced in the world's imagination to a place characterized only by the police murdering, robbing, and tormenting a selected part of the population.

Americans do not read foreign newspapers, of course. We must therefore imagine that several powerful radio stations belonging to countries hostile to the United States broadcast this pap, hotly seasoned, to the whole territory of the United States, all day long and a part of the night, nonstop. If people in the United States sceptically view these concentrated and multiplied revelations, they recall that, after all, the police admitted that three or four of its officers killed a man. Why not, then, believe that other symptoms of crime come from the same source?

In conclusion, I propose to imagine in all of that a single, rank and file, honest American policeman. He is to walk (run, when need be) and pursue criminals. He feels uncomfortable because he knows that a large part of society is moulded in the direction of seeing in him, the policeman, a major threat rather than protection from danger. When alarmed that a nearby store has just been robbed, the American policeman goes there, but thinks not so much about catching the thief as about protecting himself from suspicion that he was the robber. If other policemen begin to think and behave likewise, with time the sense of social security will weaken. Only criminals will begin to feel safer in the United States.

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CSO: 2600/399

POLAND

BRIEFS

ANDREOTTI COMMENTS ON SANCTIONS--Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, has stated that economic restrictions applied against Poland by the NATO countries after the announcement of martial law in our country were a mistake. In an article for the EUROPEO weekly Andreotti claims that maintaining traditional contacts with Poland is in the interests of the West. He also said that a further delay in granting new credits to Poland could aggravate its economic difficulties. [Text] [Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0600 GMT 30 Dec 84]

THIRD CHANNEL INTRODUCED ON TV--Warsaw, 31 Dec--The Polish television announced that it would introduce the third channel next year. The third channel is meant for educational and popularised scientific programmes, currently presented on the first and second channels, and addressed not only to schools and teachers. It is also expected to provide information and instruction programmes, and run theatrical shows for children and youth. The opening of the third channel will not affect the character of the already existing two channels. The first channel is to remain the official one, mainly based on current events, while programmes on the second channel, meant as an alternative to the first one, will be carried by the regional television centres. [Text] [Warsaw PAP in English 1403 GMT 31 Dec 84 LD]

CSO: 2600/397

ROMANIA

BRIEFS

NEW JOB FOR MORARU--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Mihai Moraru is appointed minister state secretary in the office of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania and is relieved of his position as deputy minister of the machine-building industry. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part 1 No 89, 7 Dec 84 p 2]

PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Ion Constantinescu is appointed minister state secretary in the State Planning Committee. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 89, 7 Dec 84 p 2]

ENERGY COUNCIL APPOINTMENT--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Ion M. Nicolae, deputy prime minister of the government, is relieved of his position as chairman of the Council for the Coordination of the Development of the Energy Base and the Operation of the National Energy System and Comrade Ioan Avram, deputy prime minister of the government, is appointed chairman of the Council for the Coordination of the Development of the Energy Base and the Operation of the National Energy System. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 89, 7 Dec 84 p 3]

REMOVAL OF OFFICIAL--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Mihai Emilian is relieved of his position as vice chairman of the Romanian Bank of Foreign Trade. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 89, 7 Dec 84 p 3]

CSO: 2700/67

REPORT ON 13TH SLOVENIAN LC CC MEETING

AU041253 [Editorial Report] Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian on 27 December 1984 on page 2 carries a 1,700-word article by J. Pjevic entitled "What Is Being Talked About: Indirect Polemics" reviewing speeches during the discussion at the 13th session of the Central Committee of the LC of Slovenia held in Ljubljana on 24 December.

Pjevic noted that at this session, "after a long 'pause' a Central Committee member, Vinko Hafner, once again asked himself and others the question: 'Why, already for a long time now, have the Slovene and Yugoslav communists not mentioned at all their loyalty to the idea of communism in their documents, positions, and conclusions?'" Vinko Hafner suggested himself, though "not quite categorically," the answers to this question and, Pjevic reports, said among other things: "Do we communists perhaps feel so strongly the pressure of and are confused by the aggressive anticommunist propaganda that we do not dare or do not know how to successfully oppose it and therefore prefer to keep silent about communism? And in this connection," Hafner explains, "we are discouraged by such a presentation of communism as is now current in the countries of the so-called real socialism? Or have perhaps such qualitative changes taken place in our social existence and in the role of our workers class and thereby also in the role of the League of Communists during the last 30 years of our socioeconomic development that the loyalty to communism has lost its significance or has even become superfluous," Hafner said, according to Pjevic.

Pjevic further reports that at the same session Franc Setinc dealt with the current discussion about the foreign exchange system and spoke on the unity of the Yugoslav workers class. According to Pjevic, he said in this connection: "There are some who speak about the unity of the Yugoslav workers class as a negation of the role of the peoples and nationalities and of their republics and provinces although already Lenin said that the unity of the workers class requires an unconditional respect for the equality of peoples without any mutual suspicions.

"This should be acknowledged and taken into consideration also by those who talk about the federalization of the LCY even though it is incontestably true that the workers class must confirm itself as the leading social force also among its own people and in their progress, because if it were not capable of successfully achieving this, then it also could not be successful in its internationalist, and means, Yugoslav mission," Setinc pointed out.

Stefan Korosec criticized "'certain completely new theses' on the unified Yugoslav market," Pjevic says, and some requests for a reexamination of laws just because the constitutional provisions on the unified Yugoslav market have not been fulfilled. Pjevic reports that, according to Korosec, "it is certainly unacceptable that all this is even linked with the implementation of the principle of democratic centralism because in this way the entire system of social reproduction and the system of socialist self-managing democracy 'are subordinated to the category of the unified market' and the latter is assigned a place and a role which it objectively cannot have and which are not in accord with the Constitution." Korosec stressed that the constitutional concept of a unified Yugoslav market must not be changed also because of the interests of workers and their independence--as producers of goods--in their economic operations and because of the interests of their mutual relations on the basis of income. "These interests and not the state-distribution logic are the basis for the functioning of this market," Korosec said according to Pjevic's report.

At the same session Milan Meden warned that "we must also resist the attempts to characterize every open discussion as a call for the formation of a certain faction," Pjevic reports. In this connection Korosec noted that there are some who compare the current discussion in the LC with the 1972 letter of the LCY Presidium which stimulated a strong mobilization and differentiation in the LC and society. "However, for some time now, the superficial interpreters of that process have been suggesting to us the view taken out of context from that letter that we must resolutely resist the tendencies of 'dividing the workers class according to their national and republican affiliation,'" Meden said according to Pjevic.

CSO: 2800/151

END